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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The objective of this research is to identify and evaluate socio-economic determinants 
of micro life insurance demand in Indonesia. The study is motivated by the fact that, 
while microinsurance is considered to facilitate poverty alleviation and economic 
development in emerging economies, take-up rates remain behind projections. To attract 
the required private capital needed for the provision of financial access and market 
development, however, high take-up rates are essential to create a commercially viable 
business opportunity. This study aims to provide insight in customer characteristics 
which cause actual microinsurance take-up and, thereby, facilitate more effective 
product design and distribution to seize the opportunities in microinsurance.   
 
DATA 
For this study a sample of 208 microfinance customers was collected through 
personally-administered questionnaires in the urban and semi-urban area of Jakarta, 
Indonesia. All interviewees were previously offered to participate in a micro life 
insurance program. About half of the sample decided to participate while the other half 
abstained from the program. Based on the socio-economic household data gathered in 
the field study, factors influencing the demand for microinsurance are determined 
through econometric analysis.  
 
RESULTS 
The results of this thesis, based on marginal effects probit regression analysis, support 
earlier findings regarding the positive influence of education and household wealth on 
life insurance uptake. In addition, economic capacity measurements deemed more 
appropriate for low-income households are introduced and corroborate an unambiguous 
strong positive influence of households’ relative economic capacity. Further, positive 
influence is found for respondents’ financial literacy and product understanding as well 
as client trust attitude and brand recognition. A strong negative life-cycle effect is 
revealed when taking into account economic self-sufficiency of dependents. 
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"Microfinance recognizes that poor people are remarkable reservoirs of energy and 
knowledge. And while the lack of financial services is a sign of poverty, today it is also 
understood as an untapped opportunity to create markets, bring people in from the 
margins and give them the tools with which to help themselves."  
Kofi Annan (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Poverty alleviation, economic development for third world countries, as well as creating 
attractive opportunities and new markets for the business community are the high 
expectations set in microfinance (Morduch, 1999; Karlan & Zinman, 2009). While the 
former expectations were crystallized in awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Muhammed 
Yunus and his Grameen Bank in 2006 as well as the UN’s decision to name 2005 the 
‘Year of Microcredit’, the latter is more quietly evident by the efforts economic 
institutions like the World Bank or multinational private companies spend on 
developing the field of microfinance. Since the time Muhammed Yunus received the 
Noble Peace Prize for establishing the Grameen Bank and promoting microcredit, the 
field of microfinance has expanded into more diversified services. Even though many 
microfinance institutes have also included the offering of insurance and savings in their 
portfolio, microcredit remains the most intensively researched subject within 
microfinance (Giesbert, 2010; Bendig & Arun, 2011).  
 
Microinsurance, in particular, is a vital tool in the fight against poverty (Siegel et al., 
2001; Churchill, 2002; Cohen & Sebstad, 2005; Dercon, 2006; Dercon & Kirchberger, 
2008; Chandhok, 2009). An anecdotal story reported in Adams and Raymond (2008) 
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highlights why microcredit alone cannot achieve sustainable poverty alleviation. One 
customer of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh was able – with the help of the loan – to 
start a successful rice threshing and betel nut shop. After a devastating cyclone in 2007, 
however, she lost all her productive assets but was still sitting on an outstanding loan of 
USD 900. She had lost her capability to service the loan and was even more 
impoverished than before. Insurance would have helped her to gain back her assets, 
continue to service the loan, and improve her and her family’s economic situation. This 
example illustrates how microinsurance can have a positive impact. However, to 
capitalize on the poverty alleviating potential of microinsurance, involved parties have 
“to fully understand the needs and demands of the poor to extensively contribute 
towards poverty alleviation” (Mawa, 2008, p. 881). It is recognized that studies on the 
‘microfinance revolution’ are needed to develop the field and monitor its success 
(Robinson, 2001). An enormous potential for microinsurance has been suggested by 
numerous studies (e.g. Cohen & Sebstad, 2005; McCord et al., 2006). Yet, the observed 
take-up rates of the offered microinsurance policies seem disappointing (Ito & Kono, 
2010). Dercon and Kirchberger (2008) state “the key questions to understand […is] why 
people buy or don’t buy insurance products when offered” (p. 18). To contribute in 
answering this question, for the present thesis primary data was collected from the 
clients of a microinsurance program in Indonesia and econometric analysis applied to 
identify socio-economic determinants of microinsurance demand. 
 
Microinsurance is commonly defined as the “protection of low-income people against 
specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the 
likelihood and cost of the risk involved” (Churchill, 2006, p. 12). Hence, 
microinsurance is in essence the same as regular insurance; certainly, with lower sums 
insured, lower premiums, and simpler terms and conditions to cater to the 
characteristics of the target market. Therefore, the research on microinsurance demand 
can build upon the more established field of demand studies for regular life insurance. 
The pioneer empirical studies on life insurance demand were ascribing influence on 
consumption levels to factors such as income, age, education, and number of 
dependents on a common sense basis (e.g. Hammond et al, 1967; Mantis & Farmer, 
1968; Duker, 1969). While income consistently was found to be of positive influence, 
the direction of the other characteristics seemed ambiguous. In parallel, theoretical 
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models to explain the demand for life insurance were developed (e.g. Yaari, 1965, 
Campbell, 1980; Lewis, 1989; Browne & Kim, 1993). Acknowledging that life 
insurance is basically a form of savings, the life insurance demand models took a start 
in existing theoretical work of savings utility (Marshall, 1920; Fisher, 1930). Later 
Campbell (1980) added a discussion of the bequest motive and Lewis (1989), lastly, 
established the still predominant model for life insurance consumption based on the 
interest of dependents. A multitude of empirical studies on macroeconomic and 
household level were using this theoretical framework to explore a varied set of 
hypothesis. Particularly influential variables include: age, education, marital status, 
number of dependents, income, net wealth, and occupation (c.f. Table 1).  
 
As pointed out above, micro life insurance is in principal the same as regular life 
insurance. Therefore, the few empirical studies on micro life insurance also take these 
as a starting point (Bendig & Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011). However, the context 
of microinsurance is arguably very different. Studies on the demand for agricultural 
insurance, for example, revealed that risk aversion has a negative influence on 
microinsurance uptake (Giné et al., 2007). A suggested explanation for this odd result is 
that the unfamiliar concept of insurance might represent a risky option itself for 
prospective customers (Cole et al., 2008; Ito & Kono, 2010). A lack of understanding 
for the product and insufficient funds to pay for the premium are cited as main reasons 
for not buying the offered microinsurance product (Giné et al., 2007). Formal education 
and financial literacy were examined as factors improving customers’ product 
understanding and showed a positive influence (Cole et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2010). 
Dercon et al. (2011) suggested that a lack of trust in the insurance provider is one of the 
reasons for the observed low take up rates for microinsurance. This hypothesis is 
supported by their findings in an experimental study from Kenya (Dercon et al., 2011).  
 
For micro life insurance in particular, factors regarding need perception and 
affordability were investigated. In two distinct samples from Ghana and Sri Lanka, the 
number of dependents in a household was consistently reported of positive influence 
(Bendig & Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011). The examination of an age effect revealed 
ambiguous results. In Ghana a life-cycle effect based on age squared is conceivable, 
however, in Sri Lanka no life-cycle effect could be identified (Bendig & Arun, 2011; 
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Giesbert et al., 2011). Generally, the studies on micro life insurance find a positive 
influence of formal education on insurance uptake. Further, these studies explored the 
effect of recent economic shocks, such as death or serious illness in the household, and 
found some evidence for the positive influence of experiencing illness (Bendig et al., 
2010). Also the role of remittances received by the household was investigated but 
yielded ambiguous results. While the negative influence in the one study is suggested as 
a result of substitution effects (Giesbert et al., 2011), the positive finding in the other is 
attributed to additional financial income through remittance payments (Bendig & Arun, 
2011). A positive influence of household asset endowment levels was consistently 
found in both studies.  
 
For this contribution, primary data on a voluntary micro life insurance was collected 
from Indonesia. The research opportunity came into existence thanks to the launch of a 
new microinsurance product, namely Tamadera, in the end of 2010. The micro-
endowment insurance plan which integrates life and basic health insurance is suited to 
investigate determinants of household demand since customers voluntarily chose to buy 
this product. In addition, also other characteristics are facilitating the research objective 
of identifying socio-economic demand determinants. The product fulfills many aspects 
which are considered vital in the literature (Murdoch, 2002; Churchill, 2002, 2007; 
Akula, 2008). It is a deposit-cum-insurance scheme distributed via a local and trusted 
partner, has a cap on claim payments, utilizes technology in order to reduce costs, and is 
simply structured and easy to understand. The product marketing and distribution is 
organized as a partnership between a multinational insurance company and a local 
NGO. In 2011, about six months after the launch of the product, a sample of 208 
respondents were interviewed via personally administered questionnaires. The interview 
organization was assisted by the NGO and two strata of 99 insurance participants and 
109 non-participants could be collected. The comprehensive questionnaire comprised 83 
questions on demographic and economic aspects of the respondent’s household as well 
as on the respondent’s product knowledge, financial literacy, and experience with the 
insurance providers. In the subsequent econometric analysis of the sample, using a 
marginal effect at the mean probit regression, a strong negative life-cycle effect (-0.37, 
p<0.01), which was assessed as an interaction variable between age and mature 
children, could be found. Further, a positive effect for economic capacity of the 
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household is suggested. In order to test the hypothesis that relative economic capacity is 
a decisive factor rather than absolute wealth terms in a low income environment, a set of 
new variables was included. The analysis for this hypothesis yielded a positive effect 
for asset endowment (0.38, p<0.1), relative consumption development (0.01, p<0.1), 
regular employment (0.16, p<0.05), and payment of remittances (0.29, p<0.01). In the 
light of previous findings on remittances, an interesting observation is presented in this 
analysis: the direction of influence changes with absolute value of remittances received. 
Low remittances seem to have the substitution effect proposed by Giesbert et al. (2011) 
and higher values seem to have the effect of an additional financial resource as 
suggested by Bendig and Arun (2011). Basically, the understanding could be supported 
that in a low income environment liquidity is always stressed and available cash is 
competing for alternative uses. And also previous findings by Bendig & Arun (2011) 
and Giesbert et al. (2011) that micro life insurance is mainly purchased by the wealthier 
households were supported in the Indonesian sample. The result for financial literacy’s 
influence is positive (0.40, p<0.05) as expected. For product knowledge the regression 
coefficient is also positive but not significant.  Finally, it could be found that the client’s 
experience with the institutions involved in the transaction has a positive effect (p<0.05) 
and a strong brand recognition of the insurer is positive for micro life insurance uptake 
(p<0.05). For the latter, however, causality was not tested. With these new results the 
present study adds to the literature due to three reasons. Firstly, it extends the literature 
by adding more empirical data to a subject which is scarcely researched until today. 
Secondly, it deepens the empirical literature on microinsurance demand since it 
introduces a variety of new variables which were not tested until now. And, finally, it 
allows for a comparative analysis since the investigated data can be tested against a 
reference group. 
 
In the remainder, the thesis proceeds as follows. In the next chapter, the context of 
microinsurance is described and the angles of the high expectations in this concept are 
explained. Here, particular respect is given to the situation in Indonesia, the country of 
investigation. After detailing the research field’s context and the relevancy of the 
investigated research question, the following chapter provides important background 
information on the life insurance history and concept. Firstly, the historical development 
of insurance is presented and elaborated how this relates to the current development in 
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microinsurance; secondly, the notion of demand is delineated with particular respect to 
factors influencing insurance demand. In the fourth chapter, a review of the relevant 
literature is given. This chapter is divided into a review of the established field of 
quantitative studies on regular life insurance demand and the rather unexplored field of 
microinsurance demand to highlight similarities and differences. Subsequently, building 
up on the discussed pertinent previous research the methodology for this thesis is 
established, including the description of hypotheses, the data collection process, and the 
theoretical framework underlying this study. Based on the literature review and 
theoretical framework, the sixth chapter comprises an econometric analysis of the 
sample in order to identify the socio-econometric determinants of micro life insurance 
demand in Indonesia. Chapter seven concludes the thesis by relating the research 
findings to the context of microfinance and provides ideas for further research in this 
young field of interest. 
 
2 Microinsurance in context – why understanding the 
customer matters 
The focus of this study is examining the socio-economic determinants for 
microinsurance demand to gain a better understanding on who are the buyers of 
insurance in the BoP market. There are three underlying reasons which render this 
question relevant: (i) poverty alleviation, (ii) new market opportunities, and (iii) 
macroeconomic development. In this chapter, the context of microinsurance and its 
importance in it is introduced. The expectations towards microinsurance are shown to 
be important factors motivating demand research and constitute the benchmark for 
verification with empirical results. 
 
2.1 Microfinance – more than just credit to fight poverty 
Microfinance is widely regarded as the appropriate tool to overcome the adverse 
consequences of economic downturns, nature catastrophes, and social shocks which are 
considered the main hindrance for many low-income households to escape the cycle of 
poverty (Radermacher et al., 2009). As pointed out before, this widespread belief is 
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reflected by the acknowledgments of reputable institutions like the UN and the Nobel 
Peace Prize Committee. In light of international praises and microfinance success 
stories, some even see a more profound societal change towards an inclusion of the 
Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) market in the global economic system by means of micro 
financial services (Valadez & Buskirk, 2011).  
 
The scope of microfinance has evidently evolved and widened over time. While 
Hossain (2002, www) describes it as “the practice of offering small, collateral-free loans 
to members of cooperatives who otherwise would not have access to the capital 
necessary to begin small business or other income generating activity” in 2002. Today, 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) understands microfinance to be more 
than just microcredit. For them microfinance is the provision of basic financial services 
– such as loans, savings, insurance, and money transfer services – to the poor (CGAP, 
2012). An integral part of the microfinance concept is providing financial access 
through field workers who bring the financial services to the homes and neighborhoods 
of the poor. But there is more to it than just the provision of scaled-down, common 
financial services via intense distribution channels. Microfinance works on the 
assumption that the poor have unutilized skills. That poverty is not created by the 
people but the policies and institutions surrounding them. Thus an access to financial 
services can help the poor to leverage their skills and become entrepreneurs (Yunus, 
2003). 
 
Financial arrangements are nothing new to the BoP market participants. People in 
developing countries often create informal financial associations themselves as 
instruments to cope with financial necessities (Cohen & Sebstad, 2005; Maleika & 
Kuriakose, 2008). Yet, it can be observed that informal solutions created are inferior to 
formal financial markets. Prahalad (2005), for example, finds goods and services 
offered in the BoP markets are inefficient and often come at a “poor”-premium. The 
same holds true for informal burial societies – a quasi life insurance – in rural India 
(Murdoch, 2002). Moreover, it is questionable if these informally created solutions are 
effectively addressing the participants’ needs. In 1994, Robert Townsend investigates 
the informal mechanisms existing in rural India. While he does find cooperative 
solutions, he realizes that these are not able to effectively address idiosyncratic risks 
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(Townsend, 1994). The available institutions are insufficient to fulfill the requirements 
of poor communities. Thus, the extension of formal financial services to the BoP market 
is empowering the poor. A competitive and regulated market decreases individuals’ 
dependence on reciprocal social networks and the usury interest of moneylenders. 
Microfinance provides the tools low-income households need to improve quality of life 
and enable entrepreneurism (Valadez & Buskirk, 2011). People can increase their 
productivity by investing in education, machinery, or technology. It enables BoP 
households “to build assets, increase incomes and reduce their vulnerability to 
economic stress” (Mawa, 2008, p. 876). Moreover, a sense of self-efficacy raises 
confidence and self-esteem of individuals (Bandura, 1997). Consequently, today 
numerous development organizations employ microfinance as a central instrument for 
social interventions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Hossain & Rahman, 2001). 
 
Recognized institutions like The World Bank, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) see a direct relation 
between the persistence of poverty and the lack of insurance and thus put risk reduction 
on top of their development agenda (Murdoch, 2002). Low-income households are 
especially vulnerable to the materialization of risks (Maleika & Kuriakose, 2008). Due 
to their limited resources and access to financial markets, these households are inhibited 
to make investments in their business or education. Individual, ex ante, risk 
management strategies lower chances for prosperity. And coping with financial shocks, 
ex post, is costly due to inefficient financial markets (Cohen & Sebstad, 2005). As 
Churchill (2007, p. 401) puts it “poverty and vulnerability reinforce each other in a 
downward spiral”. Jalan and Ravallion (1999) find that 40 percent of income shocks 
directly translated into reduced consumption. And Dercon (2006), in a time-series study 
in Ethiopia, observes that if the occurring income shocks during this period were 
insured, poverty could have been lowered by about a third. A detailed review of existing 
studies investigating the impact of microinsurance ex post is provided by Radermacher 
et al. (2009). For example, Ekman (2004) reports a reduction of out-of-pocket spending 
and improved recovery thanks to micro health insurance. Agricultural insurance in 
China is found to increase farm productivity and asset base (Cai et al., 2010). 
Nonetheless, the importance of product design and understanding for the target group to 
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ensure microinsurance can actually work towards poverty alleviation is expressed in a 
study by Hintz (2010).  
 
Another issue arising due to the success of microfinance is its commercial viability. A 
concept which originated from humanitarian and philanthropic ideas is becoming a 
business, raising questions about its purpose (Valadez & Buskirk, 2011).  Often a 
dilemma is perceived between achieving commercial viability and service to BoP 
households (Robinson, 2002). It is questioned if profits are appropriate if poverty 
alleviation is the objective (Magnoni & Powers, 2009). In the young history of modern 
microfinance, microfinance institutions mainly relied on donors and subsidies and only 
rarely raised capital or were able to mobilize savings (Robinson, 2002). Yet, the 
experience and resourcefulness of commercial organizations could address the needs of 
BoP households far more effectively (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). And Magnoni and Powers 
(2009) add that commercial capital markets need to be tapped if the estimated credit 
need of USD 45 billion by the poor is to be satisfied. However, fostering a for-profit 
orientation in microfinance raises the danger that institutions employ questionable and 
exploitive practices in marketing to the poor (Augsburg, 2010).  
 
In a nutshell, there are great expectations towards microfinance and its contribution to 
poverty alleviation. Particularly, microinsurance is praised for protecting BoP 
households against important risks and enabling them to take chances which can 
ultimately lead to prosperity and break the circle of poverty. Yet, the success of 
microfinance and effects of the financial crisis on development budgets tests the 
capacity of development institutions. And while development actors remain skeptical 
about the contribution of commercial organizations, private capital is needed to fuel 
microfinance’s growth trajectory. 
 
2.2 New market opportunities for financial service providers  
Not only the development lobby is critical about commerciality of microfinance, also 
private companies are cautious to enter the BoP markets. Nonetheless, commercial 
organizations are increasingly urged to participate in the microfinance movement by 
development advocates as well as opportunity-seeking investors. The small, local MFIs 
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are often not able to sustainably service the BoP market due to high transaction costs 
and small premiums (Brau & Woller, 2004). Moreover, the subsidizing by governments 
and development organizations is constrained due to budget deficits and financial crisis 
(Clark, 2004). But also multinational companies are aware of the considerable benefits 
they can reap by entering the microinsurance market. Exploring an untapped market of 
up to 3 billion potential customers not only provides profit opportunities but also helps 
to diversify the risk pool, yield process innovations, and increase reputation and brand 
value (Lloyds, 2010). Comparisons to the more advanced microcredit market show a 
market volume of USD 43 billion outstanding loans and more than 500 million 
borrowers for 2009 (Daley-Harris, 2009). In the period from 2003 to 2008 the 
compounded average growth rate (CAGR) for the microcredit market of 34 percent – 
whereas most of the traditional financial service markets were weathering the storm of a 
global financial crisis (Gonzalez, 2010). 
 
The market potential for microinsurance is considerable. In 2006 more than 78 million 
people from the BoP market already made use of some kind of microinsurance 
(McCord, 2008). Long-term trends such as increasing life-expectancy, urbanization, 
breaking up of traditional family systems, and the weakness of social security systems 
are expected to foster further market growth (Chandhok, 2009). A study by USAID, for 
example, projects a number of one billion microinsurance clients worldwide by 2018 
(McCord, 2008). Also for Indonesia the market potential is enormous. About 53 percent 
of the country’s 238 million population lives on less than USD 2 per day and are 
regarded as the microfinance’s target market (McCord et al., 2006). 
 
It is a remarkable challenge for private insurers, however, to develop this market. The 
commercial programs are still in its infancy since microfinance “only recently garnered 
global attention as a commercially viable activity” (The Economist, 2009, p. 4).  It is 
mainly a lack of understanding, experience, and data on BoP customers which hampers 
the provision of insurance services (Wipf & Garand, 2007). Limited experience and 
asymmetric information reinforce the risks due to adverse selection and moral hazard 
for the insurer. In addition, transaction costs are usually higher and contracts harder to 
enforce in the BoP market. Irregular cash flows and limited literacy of the target market 
adds to these problems.  
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The key for successful for-profit initiatives servicing the BoP is volume (Churchill, 
2007). To achieve significant numbers, marketing and analytical tools are needed to 
study and understand the clients; then transaction costs can be further decreased by the 
employment of technology (Valadez & Buskirk, 2011). In order to mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard issues seasoned microfinance concepts, like group lending, 
can be utilized. Cooperation with existing trusted MFIs and innovative concepts to use 
the entrepreneurial spirit of BoP market subjects are needed to create cost effective 
distribution channels. As Prahalad (2005) puts it “the best allies in fighting poverty are 
the poor themselves” (p. 138). Having them participate in the mammoth task also 
creates business perspectives for low-income households. Nonetheless, the incentive 
structure in selling microinsurance always needs to be carefully evaluated. Incentives 
are, on the one hand, necessary to achieve rapid market penetration, but, on the other 
hand, need to ensure that sales agents keep the good of the customer in mind. 
Reputation is fragile and in order to create sustained customers, the low product 
understanding of customers should not be exploited.  
 
But not only is the distribution system vital to for-profit success in microfinance, also 
competitive products, which provide value to clients’ needs at a fair price, are required 
(McCord, 2008). The BoP market is highly competitive. Not only want customers 
maximum value for the little money they have, but also competition from informal 
arrangements or other MFIs is high (Prahalad, 2005). A study by Webb et al. (2009) 
found that institutional characteristics such as reputation and involvement are the 
strongest predictors for microfinance customers’ purchase decision. These features are 
controllable by the financial service provider but will require some effort to build and 
maintain. To develop the market often financial literacy training and high involvement 
marketing efforts are considered necessary which are costly for the insurance providers. 
Yet, for-profit insurers might convince their shareholders to invest in microinsurance 
markets based on the rationale of sheer market size and future potential corresponding 
with economic growth, income development and loyalty of microinsurance customers. 
 
For the case of Indonesia, the country is particularly suited for pilot studies in 
microinsurance and can provide ground for aging experience (McCord et al., 2006). 
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Dense population of 117 persons per square kilometer and a high literacy rate of 88.5 
percent1 facilitate quick distribution of new microfinance products. Being the 5th largest 
country worldwide and experiencing high economic growth rates make it an attractive 
market itself. In addition, experiences made in this favorable environment can be 
utilized for the provision of microinsurance elsewhere.  
 
To sum up, although skeptical, development organizations recognize the potential of 
for-profit orientation in microfinance and also private companies are aware of the 
business opportunity. But private companies are unfamiliar with the BoP market and 
need to develop new skills and gradually gain experience in order to successfully 
include the BoP into the global market economy for the benefit of all participants.  
 
2.3 The macro-impact of microfinance 
Besides benefitting low-income households and providing new business opportunities to 
private companies, on a macroeconomic basis microfinance can also foster economic 
growth. The development of the national economy and its financial sector are strongly 
intertwined (Han et al., 2010). Indeed, so important is insurance in the trade and 
development matrix that, at its first session in 1964, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development formally acknowledged that "a sound national insurance and 
reinsurance market is an essential characteristic of economic growth" (UNCTAD, 1964, 
p. 55). Generally, the role of the banking sector for economic development is prominent 
(King & Levine, 1993; Beck et al. 2000). Applying various econometric methods and 
cross-country examples, these studies exhibit a high degree of robustness for the 
banking sector’s positive influence on economic prosperity. The insurance market, 
however, is comparably less examined (Han et al., 2010). However, it is recognized that 
the quality of the insurance market has a strong influence on economic growth, since it 
promotes financial stability, possibly substitutes for government programs, facilitates 
trade and commerce, mobilizes savings, enables efficient risk management, encourages 
loss mitigation, and fosters a more efficient capital allocation (Skipper, 1997). 
Besides the capital-market effect, also the improvement of education levels, technology, 
and creation of entrepreneurial spirit need to be accounted for (Valadez & Buskirk, 
                                                 
1
 According to the CIA World Factbook, 2011.  
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2011). In developing countries, often an abundance of labor exists which is not 
efficiently utilized. If microfinance is able to give an impulse to microeconomic 
development, this will also have an effect on an aggregated level. Woller & Parsons 
(2002) believe that the presence of microfinance can have a positive impact on a 
society’s economic capability and output “reaching well into the millions of dollars” (p. 
11).  
 
In the context of Indonesia, the mobilization of savings and increased efficiency in 
national capital allocation cannot be underestimated since about 50 percent of the 
Indonesian people belong to the income group which is targeted by microinsurance 
products. For example, if all potential microinsurance target customers in Indonesia 
would participate in the investigated microinsurance plan, Tamadera, that would mean 
about USD 25 billion of national savings (approx. 2.5 percent of GDP) which can be 
utilized for financing investments in the capital market and, thereby, increasing national 
income. Thus even though the individual policy’s nominal value has to be considered as 
“micro”, the sum of these mobilized savings can represent a significant share of national 
productive capital. As anecdotal evidence from the field in Indonesia suggests that in 
the absence of adequate saving opportunities precious metals in form of jewelry is often 
utilized. 
 
The positive effect of insurance on economic development is found to be particularly 
strong in developing countries with an elasticity of 1 percent increase in insurance 
density to 9.172 percent increase in economic growth per capita as compared to the 
elasticity in developed economies of 1 to 1.873 respectively (Han et al., 2010). Another 
study shows that even in an economic downturn in 1998, when the overall insurance 
industry experienced negative growth, the life insurance industry was still able to 
achieve a small positive development (Lim & Haberman, 2004).  
 
Altogether, a strong relationship between sound and formalized financial markets and 
national economic welfare exists. The impact microfinance can have on the individual 
level will be reflected in the aggregated numbers of any society with a significant low-
income population. The mobilization of national savings and more efficient capital 
allocation can further add to the positive macroeconomic effect of microinsurance.  
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In this chapter, it was shown that (i) microfinance in general and microinsurance in 
particular can have a positive effect on poverty alleviation and inclusion of the BoP 
market, (ii) represents an attractive business opportunity for private financial service 
companies, and (iii) promotes economic growth. Interestingly, all of these three 
microfinance’ potentials are interrelated. Currently, MFIs are often constrained in 
servicing the BoP market by limited funding from donors and governments. The 
resources of commercial organizations can take MFIs capability to provide financial 
access and efforts in alleviating poverty to a new level. Inclusion of the BoP market, in 
turn, can boost economic growth and enable national governments to improve society’s 
development. Higher national education and incomes, ultimately, increase the market 
potential for private companies. Given that these positive effects of microfinance exist, 
proving the commercial viability of microfinance is crucial to initiate this upward spiral. 
While some pilot projects are already under way, a lack of data and experience with the 
BoP market inhibits for-profit companies to participate.  
 
In the next chapter, a look at the historical development of the insurance industry shows 
that once it had to overcome the similar issues. Dwelling on the concept of demand 
shows that an understanding for the insurance purchase decision is the basis for rapid 
product dissemination and gaining volumes which create commercial viability of 
microinsurance.  
 
3 Insurance and Demand: Fundamental concepts of the 
analysis 
Before immersing into the literature on determinants of demand for life insurance, and 
more particular the demand for a micro life insurance policy, establishing an 
understanding for the concepts of insurance and demand is beneficial. Therefore, in the 
following chapter, firstly, a brief overview on the historic development of insurance, a 
differentiation of the two main insurance types and its implications is given. Secondly, 
the nature of demand and factors influencing it are highlighted to provide the grounds 
for further analysis. 
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3.1 Historical development of insurance: a blueprint for 
microinsurance? 
Insurance evolved as a result of the economic development of societies. Already as 
early as 2250 B.C. the Code of Hammurabi, a Babylonian King, set forth that a 
borrower should be freed from its liability if he is befallen by an accident in return for 
higher interest payments (Trennery, 1926). Nelli (1972) argues that the Commercial 
Revolution in the 13th century sparked the need for a true insurance device. The first 
documented insurance contract dates back to 1343 and was written for a merchant ship, 
the Santa Catlina (Nelli, 1972). By pooling the risk associated with an individual 
venture, many commercial undertakings were made possible in the first place. In its 
definition insurance is a private contract in which one party accepts the transfer of a 
risk, the other party is exposed to due to the uncertain materialization of an adverse 
event, in exchange for certain premium payments (Rejda, 2010).  
 
An important step in the evolution of the insurance industry took place in the 19th 
century. Until then, the premiums for an insurance contract were basically established as 
result of haggling and business knowledge of the contracting parties. With the advent of 
premium pricing based on actuarial models, insurance provision became feasible 
beyond a group of knowledgeable business men. Nowadays, statistical modeling allows 
calculating insurance for more or less any risk which can be quantified (Rejda, 2010). 
As a result an interminable list of available insurance policies was created which is 
generally divided into either Property & Casualty Insurance or Life Insurance.  
 
As expounded above, the development of P&C Insurance has its historic roots in the 
necessities of commerce. Legal frameworks and innovative policies evolved in parallel 
to the requirements of commercial activities. Life Insurance, on the other hand, has a 
less explicit origin. The burial societies which already existed 2500 B.C. in Egypt and 
thrived in antique Greece and Rome can be considered as early types of life insurance 
(Vance, 1908). Similar informal arrangements are still widespread in developing 
countries today. The modern form of life insurance, however, took a controversial 
origin in the 15th century (Clark, 1999). First, as part of a merchant ship’s freight 
insurance the lives of the slaves aboard were also covered under the merchant’s casualty 
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policy. Later it became common to underwrite an insurance on a debtor’s life to 
increase his line of credit and provide a collateral for the principal (Stefani, 1958). This 
concept is similar to the common Credit Life insurance policies offered today. As the 
trade with life insurance evolved into a type of gambling, were people, for example, 
also wrote policies on the life of popes or kings, life insurance got condemned as 
immoral by the church and banned in Continental Europe (Clark, 1999). In England life 
insurance remained legal and its development continued until the 19th century when 
actuarially-based life insurance companies and annuity societies emerged (Clark, 1999). 
Nonetheless, it was still regarded objectionable based on ethical considerations (Clark, 
1999). Also in the US the market for life insurance had a delicate evolution. Insurance 
on life was considered as speculation with death and represented a bet against God 
which would be punished by God as a crime (Zelizer, 1979). But with the progress of 
enlightenment and industrialization life insurance became gradually popular among 
middle-class families as a tool to preserve wealth and for protection of dependents. The 
trends of urbanization, disintegration of families, and spread of financial access further 
promoted life insurance.  
 
When evaluating the opportunities in the microfinance market also the experience of 
microbanking in 18th century Europe should be considered. In the 18th century, member-
owned microfinance institutes emerged in many parts of Europe which were a driving 
force of economic development (Seibel, 2010). In Germany, for example, these former 
microfinance institutions, such as Raiffeisenbak or Sparkasse, are dominating the 
national banking sector until today. The current boom in microfinance should leverage 
on this historical success story in its further development.  
 
In summary, the life insurance as it is now established in industrialized countries had its 
origins in informal finance institutions – just like microinsurance today. At the 
beginning of a formal market development, were simple credit-life schemes. 
Furthermore, before its success story it was considered immoral and undesirable for 
centuries. In fact, insurance was still regarded as a service for the low-income 
populations in the 19th century. The bourgeois households preferred to self-insure by 
means of their wealth (Churchill, 2007). Not before historic philosophical and economic 
societal changes and a rising middle-class, life insurance gained momentum in the 
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western markets. Nowadays, life insurance premiums account for almost 60 percent of 
total insurance premiums. The global life insurance premium market accounted for four 
percent of worldwide GDP that is about USD 2.5 trillion in 2009 (SwissRe, 2010).  
 
3.2 Demand for life insurance and the importance of volume 
In today’s market economy the concepts of supply and demand are fundamental. In this 
thesis, the focus of the investigation is on the demand side of this elemental economic 
equation. Demand is characterized as the quantity of a given product consumers are 
willing to buy at a given price. Thus, in economic theory the critical factor for the 
demand for a given product is its price. However, besides the price of a product there 
are other factors determining the demand for a product. Salient factors are preferences, 
income, and number of consumers in a market as well as prevailing interest rates and 
prices of complementary or substitute products. Altogether these factors determine the 
level of effective demand which is the quantity consumers are willing and able to buy of 
a given product (Mankiw, 2008).  
 
In the life insurance market in particular, the price elasticity for demand is considered of 
lesser importance. Life insurance is “characterized as a ‘sold good’ not a ‘bought good’” 
(Babbel, 1985). This notion is supported by two reasons: firstly, typically the initiative 
in a life insurance transaction comes from the seller and not the buyer (Zultowski, 
1979); secondly, the complexity of pricing in life insurance contracts makes 
comparisons difficult for buyers (Auxier, 1976; Crosby & Stephens, 1987). In a survey 
amongst insurance agents, it was found that less than 20 percent of sales are initiated by 
the consumer (Zultowski, 1979).  
 
The complexity of life insurance pricing, or insurance premium, lies in its combination 
of actuarial value and loading factor. Actuarial value is the expected payoff from an 
insurance policy. Following this definition, a risk-averse person will always be better 
off by entering into an actuarially fair insurance coverage (Hofmann, 2009). But the 
provision of insurance is also costly. The second price component, the loading factor of 
a policy premium usually includes a safety buffer, taxes, and all the administrative costs 
attached to providing an insurance plan (Vaté & Dror, 2002). For example, in the US 
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market the average load for a life insurance policy is estimated at 18 percent; and if the 
policy is terminated before maturity these costs can increase up to 51 percent due to 
high front-loads (Browne & Finkelstein, 2007). Thus, besides the complexity in 
actuarial valuation of a policy and differences in models across insurance companies, 
the load factor is a considerable price component with potential for differentiation.  
 
Despite the difficulty of comparing insurance prices, particularly in microinsurance, 
competitive pricing is of high importance. On the one hand, low-income households in 
emerging markets are particularly price-sensitive (Prahalad, 2005). On the other hand, 
with its very small premiums and risks covered the loading factor as a percentage of the 
premium is relatively higher in microinsurance (Churchill, 2007). 
This constitutes sort of a dilemma for microinsurance: While demand for life insurance 
is negatively correlated with its price (Mantis and Farmer, 1968; Campbell, 1980; 
Babbel, 1985; Browne and Kim, 1993), the costs of insurance provision can be expected 
to significantly decrease with high volumes. Diamond (1992), for example, finds that 
the load factor on insurance for fewer than five persons insured is 40 percent, whereas 
the load for a group of 10,000 or more insured is at 5.5 percent. Therefore, an 
understanding of the other factors influencing demand for life insurance is of utmost 
importance in the development of the microinsurance market. It is the objective of this 
research to find demand determinants for micro life insurance besides insurance 
premium.  
 
In the next section, previous empirical studies on the demand for life insurance are 
presented. While some of them were investigating the influence of insurance premium, 
most are focusing on other factors. The discussed results will lay the foundation for the 
hypotheses investigated in this study.  
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4 Empirical investigations of the demand for life insurance  
To examine the demand determinants for a micro life insurance policy in Indonesia, it is 
beneficial to explore and relate to previous research on the topic. A review of the 
literature enables identification of potentially relevant factors and qualified methods of 
analysis. Further, unexplored niches can be detected. Hence, the review builds the basis 
for formulation of hypotheses and choice of analytical method. However, quantitative 
demand research for micro life insurance is a young and relatively unexplored field in 
the literature. Therefore, first the contribution of qualitative examinations on 
microinsurance demand is recognized. Second, insights are drawn on insurance demand 
determinants in general from the established field of quantitative demand studies on 
regular life insurance. Lastly, quantitative studies on microinsurance demand in general 
and micro life insurance in particular are discussed. 
 
4.1 Relevant insights from qualitative research on microinsurance 
Qualitative research is a widespread methodology in social science and development 
studies in particular (Hulme, 2007). Also in order to identify factors contributing to the 
demand of microinsurance a qualitative approach is deemed useful (McCord et al., 
2006). Techniques usually used in qualitative research are: observation, in-depth 
interviews with key persons, focus group discussions, and biographical methods 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Often employed for the demand research on microinsurance 
are interview and focus group techniques. Both techniques inherent are the importance 
of the relationship between research subject and researcher. The researcher’s objectivity 
is constrained since she needs to purport the issues addressed as well as record and 
interpret the individual answers given. However, in a new field of research, like 
microinsurance, qualitative approaches can be a valuable instrument to explore the topic 
and narrow down important issues to be addressed in further investigations.  
 
Gathering qualitative data from key people often involves the supply side by 
interviewing knowledgeable practitioners on insurance or MFI level. Focus group 
discussions are more appropriate for examination of the microinsurance target group. 
They generally consist of 8 to 12 persons and are used as an explorative tool to learn 
about needs and concerns of the target group (PlaNet Finance, 2011). The topics 
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investigated include clients’ comprehension of insurance, risk understanding, and 
willingness and ability to pay as well as life-cycle, time series of crisis, income 
seasonality, expenditures, savings and credit, and seasonality of risk (McCord et al., 
2006). Relevant to this study, for example, trough in-depth interviews it was found that 
a lack of understanding is an important factor impeding the participation in 
microinsurance (De Allegri et al., 2006). And other qualitative studies identified trust in 
the involved institutions as an important influence on microinsurance demand by means 
of focus group discussions and case studies (Schneider & Diop, 2001; Basaza et al., 
2008; Patt et al., 2009). 
 
While qualitative techniques are valuable tools in identifying insurance demand drivers 
within a community, this study focuses on quantitative techniques and results. A 
considerable body of literature is directed at the examination of demand determinants of 
regular life insurance, which can provide important insights for the analysis at hand. 
Thus in the next section an overview of this literature is given. Regarding 
microinsurance demand, however, quantitative data is rather limited. Results of 
qualitative studies can amend these investigations and are, therefore, considered 
subsequently when considered appropriate. 
 
4.2 Review of quantitative empirical studies on life insurance demand 
In this chapter, quantitative studies regarding the demand for regular life insurance are 
reviewed to learn more about research designs and factors related to the life insurance 
demand. First of all, differences in the design of these studies as well as the 
development of the research field are stated. Subsequently, a more detailed review of 
the findings on the most important demographic and economic influence factors is 
provided. 
 
4.2.1 The design of regular life insurance demand studies 
The following section consists of a synopsis of methods applied and results reported in 
empirical, quantitative studies regarding the demand for life insurance. 
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Prior work on the consumption of life insurance recognized three important demand 
drivers: demographic, economic, and institutional factors. Institutional factors are 
generally subject of country-comparison studies. It is found that the development of the 
financial service sector is a significant predictor of life insurance demand (Beck & 
Webb, 2003). An established legal framework which protects creditor’s and property 
rights and facilitates the enforcement of contracts is arguably of positive influence 
(Beck & Webb, 2003). Though, existent empirical results did not support this 
proposition so far (Beck & Webb, 2003). The present study comprises an analysis of 
demand factors on a household level in a homogenous institutional environment. For 
this reason, the presented review of relevant literature is focused on the work on 
demographic and economic demand factors. 
 
Demographic and economic demand determinants are either investigated on a 
household level or based on macroeconomic data. The use of aggregated data to explore 
demographic and economic determinants of life insurance demand, however, brings 
about some limitations: (i) the indicators aggregate supply and demand factors for life 
insurance and a subsequent distinction is not possible, (ii) prices for life insurance are 
affected by national government policies and market structure and thus a cross-national 
comparison has limitations (Beck & Webb, 2003). According to Beck and Webb (2003) 
these problems are mitigated by the fact that price is related to supply-side factors and, 
since they are included in the regression model, it can be controlled for the price effect.  
In addition, comparing insurance demand on a country basis requires the assumption 
that national aggregate data represent an average national household and thus assume 
that inhabitants in one country are homogenous as compared to other countries (Browne 
& Kim, 1993). This causes an additional potential source of error, for developing 
countries in particular this measurement of insurance consumption arguably leads to a 
bias since often considerable differences in income distribution exist.2  
Due to the loss of information in the aggregation of data, empirical macroeconomic 
studies can only provide limited insight into the determinants of life insurance demand. 
However, they are an important source for comparisons across country and can provide 
valuable hints regarding which factors should be examined in more detail.  
                                                 
2
 Based on distribution of family income – Gini Index (CIA, 2011, www). 
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Microeconomic data on the demand for life insurance, on the other hand, are more 
difficult to obtain. Researchers either need to fall back on general household and 
consumer surveys which hamper the possibility to investigate specific research 
questions or conduct their own laborious consumer surveys. In a first empirical 
investigation of determinants of household life insurance premium expenditures, 
Hammond et al. (1967), for example, used two cross-sectional data sets which were 
published by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in 1953 and 
1962 respectively. The data do not distinguish for the type of insurance owned, thus, 
term, whole life, and endowment policies have to be treated equally. Their investigation 
is said to be “the first to address specific life insurance demand determinants” (Zietz, 
2003, p. 160). The pioneer empirical studies on the demand for life insurance were 
conducted in parallel to the theoretical discussion of life insurance demand models in 
the 1960s and apply a common sense approach to justify the selection of variables (e.g. 
Hammond et al., 1967; Mantis & Farmer, 1968; Neumann, 1969; Duker, 1969). 
Nowadays, it is common practice to relate the identification of variables to theoretical 
models (e.g. Lewis, 1989; Browne & Kim, 1993; Outreville, 1996). 
 
Hammond et al. (1967) in their study focused on nine different independent variables to 
explain household expenditure on life insurance premium. For their sample of US 
households’ income and net worth – inter alia – proved to be statistically significant 
factors. Since their groundbreaking empirical work at least 26 additional empirical 
investigations for life insurance demand determinants were published in peer-reviewed 
journals (Zietz, 2003, p. 160). The results of Hammond et al. (1967) for income and net 
wealth were replicated in an array of additional studies. Hence, the empirical, 
quantitative examination of life insurance demand seems to produce reliable results. In 
Table 1 below an overview on the empirical findings of the determinants for life 
insurance demand is presented. 
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Table 1: Determinants of regular life insurance demand 
 
Source: Based on Zietz (2003) with adjustments by the author. 
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As shown in Table 1 the most commonly investigated variables are Age, Number of 
Dependents, Education, Asset Endowment, and Income. While the first three influence 
factors can be considered demographic, the latter two are attributed to the economic 
situation of a household. The influence of demographic characteristics seems – prima 
facie – rather ambiguous, whereas the results for economic factors offer an unequivocal 
picture. Subsequently, these commonly tested variables are regarded as the standard 
variables in life insurance determinants research. For a better understanding of these 
important influences, in the following a brief description of studies, findings and their 
interpretations is given. 
 
4.2.1.1 The demographic determinants 
Age 
Based on theoretical considerations age is expected to be an influential variable on life 
insurance demand since it influences the expected probability of death and the amount 
of future earnings an individual is expected to accumulate (Campbell, 1980; Lewis, 
1989). Further it can serve as a proxy for the life-cycle stage of a family (Duker, 1969; 
Ferber & Lee, 1980). The positive influence due to higher death probability, however, is 
probably offset by adjusted insurance premiums and decreasing dependency of children 
(Hammond et al., 1967). In addition, people of higher age are likely to have 
accumulated wealth which can serve as a substitute for life insurance. This offsetting 
effect due to actuarial calculations and life-cycle development might be an explanation 
for the ambiguous results found for age in the literature (cf. Table 1). Empirical tests 
suggest that the influence of age depends on income class and type of insurance 
(Hammond et al., 1967; Ferber & Lee, 1980). While people on lower income classes 
seem to find less value in life insurance as they age, more affluent households perhaps 
consider it as an appropriate tool for retirement savings. Controlling for a life-cycle 
effect, age is found to be of positive but diminishing influence as the household matures 
(Showers & Shotick, 1994). On a country level, the positive effect of population age 
might be related to higher economic development and increased need for retirement 
savings (Truett & Truett, 1990).  
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Education 
Education is intuitively associated with increased life insurance spending. Higher 
formal education is thought to foster need awareness and enable more objective analysis 
for the life insurance purchase decision (Hammond et al., 1967). Moreover, higher 
educated individuals are hypothesized to have a stronger inclination to protect their 
dependents by means of life insurance (Truett & Truett, 1990). Generally, education 
correlates with higher demand for life insurance in empirical investigations (Hammond 
et al., 1967; Burnett & Palmer, 1984). The report by Gutter and Hatcher (2008) that 
higher educated individuals “had greater proportion of their human capital insured” (p. 
685) supports these earlier results. Yet, there is evidence that the effect of education is 
influenced by additional factors. Higher educated spouses, for example, even though 
aware of life insurance’s benefits, are less dependent on the income of their husbands 
(Ferber & Lee, 1980; Gandolfi & Miners, 1996). Alternatively, higher educated parents 
anticipate longer financial dependency of their offspring due to pursuit of higher 
educational levels (Browne & Kim, 1993). Results suggesting a negative influence of 
education in the reviewed literature are potentially biased by exogenous factors such as 
inflationary periods (Anderson & Nevin, 1975) or assess the relative insurance 
consumption of households (Auerbach & Kotlikoff, 1989).  
 
Number of Dependents 
The number of dependents is thought to increases the financial protection requirements 
of a household throughout the literature. Already the early studies incorporated this 
variable on an a priori basis in their models (Hammond et al., 1967; Mantis & Farmer, 
1968; Duker, 1969; Berekson, 1972). Hammond et al. (1967) state “if an individual has 
no one dependent on his earnings […], then the need for life insurance […] may not 
exist at all” (p. 399). In his application of the economics of uncertainty, Campbell 
(1980) tied the influence of dependents to an individual’s intensity for bequests. 
Acknowledging income transfers on behalf of dependents, it was Lewis (1989) who 
developed the prevalent model in which the demand for life insurance is primarily 
driven by the interest of dependents. A review of the empirical literature demonstrates a 
predominantly positive influence of dependents on regular life insurance demand (cf. 
Table 1). However, in some cases a high number of dependents lead to lower insurance 
demand, possibly due to budget constraints (Ferber & Lee, 1980). Also demand 
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elasticity is decreasing in the number of children suggesting economies of scale in life 
insurance demand (Showers & Shotick, 1994). From macroeconomic data it was 
inferred that life insurance demand development lags behind number of births by two 
years (Mantis & Farmer, 1968). Browne and Kim (1993) found a strong positive 
influence of national dependency ratios, that is children below age 15 over population 
between 15 and 64, for life insurance uptake and even stronger for the amounts insured.  
 
4.2.1.2 The economic determinants 
Asset Endowment 
Theoretical considerations relate the individual asset endowment to the demand for life 
insurance (Pratt, 1964; Babbel, 1985; Lewis, 1989). Based on the model proposed by 
Lewis (1989) the direction of wealth’s influence should be negative. Also Fortune 
(1973) theorizes an inverse relationship between asset endowment and life insurance 
demand and finds some supportive empirical evidence in a time-series of 
macroeconomic US data. On the other hand, Babbel (1985) states that the influence of 
wealth is ambiguous and “dependent upon the shape of the absolute risk aversion 
function of the insurance consumer” (p. 230). This notion is supported by Hammond et 
al. (1967) who argue that net worth of a household could intuitively either be perceived 
as substitute for life insurance which can be utilized to maintain its standard of living or 
it could have a positive effect on life insurance consumption since family heads might 
want to protect the household’s asset endowment beyond their life time by using life 
insurance. In empirical studies a positive influence of household’s wealth on life 
insurance uptake prevails (cf. Table 1). Yet, a differentiation for income classes 
suggests a more articulate effect of wealth levels in low and high income classes than in 
the middle income class (Hammond et al., 1967). Furthermore, wealthier households 
utilize life insurance rather as a protection against the risk of premature death, whereas 
less well endowed households have an increased utility form a policy which is including 
a savings component (Anderson & Nevin, 1975). 
 
Income 
Income is the most frequently tested factor and consistently found to be of significant 
influence (cf. Table 1). Contrary to the representation in economic literature, not capital 
27 
income uncertainty but uncertainty from labor income – or human capital uncertainty – 
is the prevalent risk for household consumption (Campbell, 1980). In the existing 
literature, life insurance is regarded as the appropriate means to mitigate the risk 
inherent to a household’s income stream due to uncertain lifetime of the main 
breadwinner (Yaari, 1965; Fischer, 1973; Pissarides, 1980; Lewis, 1989). Thereby, 
income itself is a relevant factor regarding the demand for life insurance: firstly, a 
certain minimum level of income is required to make life insurance affordable and, 
secondly, income determines the level of a household’s total consumption and, 
therefore, the rational amount of life insurance according to theoretical models (Yaari, 
1965; Lewis, 1989).  
Empirically, the influence of income was tested on aggregated macroeconomic data and 
on household level. In macroeconomic studies often the GDP per capita is related to life 
insurance premium expenditures. Several studies found a statistically significant, 
positive influence with elasticity figures ranging between 0.32 and 0.62 (Browne & 
Kim, 1993; Outreville, 1996; Li et al., 2007). Noteworthy for the present investigation 
of micro life insurance, two studies reported somewhat higher income elasticity figures 
in less developed countries (Truett & Truett, 1990; Beck & Webb, 2003). Ward & 
Zuerbruegg (2000) investigate the reverse relationship between GDP and life insurance 
premiums, testing if life insurance promotes economic growth. In their sample of 
OECD countries from 1961 to 1996 they find ambiguous results. A Granger causality 
analysis reveals that the direction of the relationship depends on national circumstances, 
such as national culture or regulative norms.  
On a household level positive income elasticity was also consistently reported, however, 
figures between 0.02 and 0.35 are somewhat lower (Hammond et al., 1967; Showers & 
Shotick, 1994). Differentiation for income classes reveals a particularly high elasticity 
for middle income households (Hammond et al., 1967). The absolute amount of life 
insurance coverage purchased, on the contrary, is rather high for low and high income 
groups (Anderson & Nevin, 1975). This non-linear relation between income and life 
insurance purchased is thwarting prior emphasis (c.f. Hammond et al., 1967; Duker, 
1969; Berekson, 1972). 
One explanation for this unforeseen result is a utility function as proposed by Friedman 
and Savage (1968) (Figure 1). 
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Assuming that the two convex portions of the curve apply to low and high incomes and 
the concave part in between applies for middle incomes, than the middle income 
households might have a preference for risk taking (Anderson & Nevin, 1975). A 
relationship between life insurance demand and income following this pattern could 
explain why income elasticity is higher in developing countries. As the population 
average income increases from very low towards middle class levels, the utility of 
insurance is particularly strong. 
Finally, another household level study focused on the influence of income risk 
diversification (Showers & Shotick, 1994). It was found that the demand for life 
insurance is significantly lower in multi-earner households.  
In summary, income was shown to be of positive influence by almost all empirical 
studies (cf. Table 1). As discussed above macroeconomic data strongly suggests a 
positive relationship between GDP per capita levels and life insurance consumption. On 
a household basis, researchers were able to show that differences exist for income 
classes and multi-earner households. Unexpectedly, lower income classes seem to have 
a higher utility from life insurance than the middle classes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Friedman-Savage utility function 
 
Source: Adapted from Anderson & Nevin (1975, p. 382) 
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Other determinants relevant for the study 
Other demand determinants previously investigated which are also relevant for the 
present thesis include: Occupation, Expected Future Income, Religion, and Brand 
Loyalty. 
 
The occupation of the insured is subject to several life insurance demand studies. In 
their pioneer study, Hammond et al. (1967) find a positive association of working in a 
white-collar type profession with household’s life insurance demand. This result is 
supported by subsequent investigations (Duker, 1969; Ferber & Lee, 1980; Miller, 
1985; Fitzgerald, 1987; Auerbach & Kotlikoff, 1989). On a macroeconomic level, 
Mantis and Farmer (1968) report a positive relationship between employment rates and 
life insurance demand.  
 
Income expectation of households and its relation to life insurance demand was 
investigated by Anderson and Nevin (1975). They found that households which 
expected to be in a higher income category in ten years ahead purchased higher amounts 
of life insurance today. 
 
Religion is theorized to be associated with life insurance demand for two reasons: 
firstly, historic development of life insurance was often in conflict with religious views 
and for some time condemned as distrust in God’s protective care (cf. Chapter 3.1); 
secondly, a society’s culture is said to be influenced by religious beliefs and related to 
levels of risk aversion (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). On a household level, Burnett and 
Palmer (1984) investigated the relationship between religion salience and life insurance 
consumption a middle-sized US city. The respondents who indicated a high importance 
of religion owned considerably less life insurance than people who claimed a low 
interest in religion. Macroeconomic studies have found that the demand for life 
insurance is significantly less widespread in predominantly Muslim countries – like 
Indonesia (Browne & Kim, 1993). Yet, this might not be evidence for higher religious 
salience or risk aversion in Islamic imprinted societies but rather a result of constrained 
life insurance supply. For a believing Moslem the regular life insurance contract is not a 
viable option due to Islamic regulations (Redzuan et al., 2009). To meet the demands of 
Muslim consumers the takaful insurance was developed in Sudan in 1979. Since then, 
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the new concept is successful marketed in Islamic countries. For example, since the 
introduction of takaful in Malaysia in 1985 it was able to gain a market share of 13 
percent (Redzuan et al., 2009).  
 
Finally, respondents from households which owned higher amounts of life insurance 
indicated a lower brand loyalty (Burnett & Palmer, 1984). As possible explanation, 
Burnett and Palmer (1984) suggest “that owners of large amounts of insurance purchase 
coverage from several different insurers” (p. 459).  
 
The review of the empirical literature on regular life insurance demand above yielded a 
set of socio-economic determinants which can, generally, be considered influential. 
However, the demand for life insurance is dependent on individual consumer’s 
characteristics and needs (Burnett & Palmer, 1984). Arguably, the reality of low income 
households in developing countries – the target group for micro life insurance – differs 
in some aspects from the context in which the above studies were conducted. As per 
definition the target group of microinsurance is low-income households, besides the 
obvious lower financial capabilities and asset endowment other relevant characteristics 
are attributed to this particular group. Foremost it is a lack of access to finance, less 
experience with financial services, irregular income streams, a lower understanding of 
the product and need awareness, as well as preponderance of informal financial service 
arrangements (Murdoch, 2002; Churchill, 2007). Hence, factors found influential on the 
demand for regular life insurance in developed countries might have a different or no 
effect in the microinsurance context. Moreover, also factors which were previously not 
considered relevant might are of interest in the analysis of microinsurance demand. 
Unfortunately, there is only limited empirical work on the demand for micro life 
insurance. To learn more about context-specific demand determinants, in the next 
section also studies on agricultural and health microinsurance are considered as well as 
work which was not yet published in a peer-reviewed journals.  
 
4.2.2 Studies on microinsurance uptake  
Until today, quantitative, empirical studies on what determines the demand for 
microinsurance are scarce. However, the available studies from various developing 
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countries provide important insight for the analysis in this thesis. While the focus of 
these studies varies, they are all investigating peculiarities of low-income customers in 
developing countries. Typically, the focus of the studies is on “product and marketing 
characteristics, socioeconomic household characteristics and the degree of risk aversion 
as potential explanatory factors for demand” (Morsink, 2011, p. 5). The different 
product types researched can be grouped into: (i) life insurance, (ii) health insurance, 
(iii) agricultural insurance, and (iv) other microinsurance studies. Table 2 provides an 
overview of influence factors investigated and the according findings. 
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Table 2: Significant variables in microinsurance demand research 
 
Note: [+] indicates positive influence of researched variable and [-] negative influence respectively. Studies marked 
with an asterisk * were published in a peer-reviewed journal. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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Comparing the results with the findings for the demand on regular life insurance age, 
wealth, and education show a similar relationship. The number of dependents seems to 
have a somewhat more reliable positive influence in the microinsurance context and, 
oddly, risk aversion is in some cases negatively related to insurance participation. While 
income – a commonly significant variable for regular life insurance demand – is rarely 
investigated, credit constraints, reception of remittance, insurance skills, recent shock 
events and trust are added to the analyses on microinsurance.  
 
The first noted quantitative study on the demand for microinsurance was conducted by 
Giné, Townsend, and Vickery in 2007 for the World Bank. They investigated a rainfall-
index agricultural insurance which was offered through a cooperation of an international 
insurer and a local MFI in southern India. Respondent’s age, credit constraints, 
sedentary residence and risk aversion were found to be of negative influence. Land 
cultivation, technology adoption, membership in financial groups and familiarity with 
other participating households were positively related. Most prominent reasons cited by 
respondents for non-participation were a lack of product understanding and money to 
pay premiums (Giné et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, the take-up rate for the product researched by Giné et al. (2007) lagged 
considerably behind microinsurance demand projections with mere 4.6 percent 
participation at the time of research. Subsequently, the focus of many quantitative 
studies shifted to exploring why the microinsurance uptake lags to such an extent 
behind projections (e.g. Cole et al., 2008; Ito & Kono, 2010; Cai et al., 2010; Cole et al., 
2010; Cai et al., 2011; Dercon et al., 2011). With a set of experimental studies the roles 
of liquidity, financial literacy, and trust on microinsurance uptake in particular were 
investigated. 
Low financial capability and constrained liquidity is theorized to be a main barrier for 
low-income households to utilize microinsurance as risk management tool (Cole et al., 
2008). Field experiments in India and Indonesia suggest that a positive liquidity shock 
at the time an insurance product is offered or the subsidization of financial services have 
a positive effect on participation (Cole et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2010).  
Education is consistently found to be a positive predictor of microinsurance uptake in 
the literature (cf. Table 2). A study on the demand for financial services in Indonesia 
revealed a positive influence of education and cognitive abilities on demand for formal 
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financial services – including insurance – and negative influence on participation in 
informal arrangements (Cole et al., 2010). More specifically, financial literacy is found 
“an important predictor of financial behavior in emerging market countries” (Cole et al., 
2010, p. 37). Experimental studies employing a financial literacy education module, 
however, showed to have only an insignificant effect (Cole et al., 2008; Cole et al., 
2010; Dercon et al., 2011)3. A brief training module is possibly insufficient to 
substantially enhance client education and, consequently, product comprehension. 
“Clients’ understanding of insurance products [however] is key not only to take up of 
insurance, but also to use and appreciation of the policy as well as satisfaction with the 
insurance” (Dercon, 2008, p. 16). 
Further, in contrast to prior findings on regular insurance, a negative relation between 
risk aversion and uptake was identified. Supposedly, participation in the unfamiliar 
insurance represents a risky option by itself to the surveyed households (Cole et al., 
2008; Ito & Kono, 2010). Trust is a mitigating factor and its importance for 
microinsurance participation is suggested (Dercon, 2008; Schneider, 2005; Basaza et 
al., 2008; Patt et al., 2009). As pointed out above, among the services offered by 
microfinance providers, insurance needs the highest degrees of trust on customer side. 
Trust, however, is a vague concept and cannot be easily tested for. Various quantitative 
studies tried to control for this influence. Cole et al. (2008), for example, used the 
endorsement by a well-known party as a proxy. Studying a sow insurance product 
offered by the government in China, Cai et al. (2010) used the participation in another 
health insurance provided by the government and the previous reliable reception of 
government subsidies as proxies for trust and found both to have a significant positive 
impact. Fortunately for the research, a snow storm occurred in the sample area which 
killed some of the insured sows and provided a new research opportunity. It could be 
shown that in villages with more claim payments, demand for insurance coverage 
significantly increased. The positive effect of observing satisfied claims is also reported 
by Morsink & Geurts (2011).  
                                                 
3
 In cost benefit analysis, a USD 17 per head financial literacy training yielded only an increase of formal 
financial service demand of about 5 percent; subsidies, on the other hand, of USD 14 increased 
probability of opening a bank account by 7.6 percent; making subsidies about 2.5 times more cost 
efficient that financial literacy training (Cole et al., 2010). 
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The importance of social networks was shown in another study from China. 
Respondents who participated together with friends in a microinsurance marketing 
event were more likely to take-up the offered product than respondents who were 
informed individually about the insurance (Cai et al., 2011). In an experimental design 
in Kenya, Dercon et al. (2011) could show that persons who were more trustful in a 
classical sender-receiver trust game, in which the receiver was always the field staff of 
the participating MFI, were also more likely to take-up insurance. 
 
In a nutshell, studies on microinsurance other than life policies show mixed results for 
the influence of age and number of dependents. Income and asset endowment of the 
household as well as education and financial literacy of the respondent is positively 
related to microinsurance demand. In contrast to regular life insurance demand, risk 
aversion seems to be negatively related to insurance demand. Regarding the influence of 
trust, endorsement by a trusted party, membership in other financial groups, and 
observation of claim payment served as proxies and exhibited significant positive 
influence.  
 
The demand for micro life insurance is so far a rather unexplored field. Presumably a 
lack of appropriate sample data is one of the main reasons for the limited research on 
this interesting and important topic. In the literature, two distinct data sets build the 
basis for quantitative micro life insurance research so far. The first is from 1030 
households and once more from 350 households of one population in Ghana and the 
second from 330 households in Sri Lanka.  
For the samples from Ghana, consistently a positive influence of age and negative for 
age squared is found which is interpreted as life-cycle effect (Bendig et al., 2010; 
Giesbert, 2010; Giesbert et al., 2011). In Sri Lanka, age is negatively related to 
insurance demand and ‘no life-cycle effect at all’ could be found (Bendig & Arun, 
2011). The number of dependents exhibits a positive correlation in all micro life 
insurance studies (cf. Table 2). Income from non-agricultural activities increases the 
demand for life insurance in Ghana suggesting a negative influence of income 
seasonality (Giesbert, 2010). In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, self-employment and 
associated irregular cash flows have a positive influence on micro life insurance 
purchase (Bendig & Arun, 2011). Also the role of remittances is ambiguous between the 
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two countries. While remittances received are negatively related to insurance uptake in 
Ghana and believed to have an substituting effect (Bendig et al, 2010; Giesbert et al., 
2011); they seem to serve as an additional financial resource in Sri Lanka and increase 
micro life insurance participation (Bendig & Arun, 2011). Wealth is consistently of 
positive influence in all studies (cf. Table 2). This suggests that the very poor 
households are still excluded from microinsurance (Bendig et al., 2010: Giesbert, 2010). 
Educational level of the household head is, generally, a positive predictor of insurance 
demand (cf. Table 2). The specific influence of financial literacy was not tested for 
micro life insurance so far, even though it is considered a more fruitful control factor 
than education levels (Giné et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2009, Bendig & Arun, 2011). The –
theory contradicting – negative influence of risk aversion is often associated with a lack 
of product understanding (Bendig & Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011).  
Commonly, also a location dummy is included in the studies on microinsurance demand 
and often found significant. However, since the meaning of this dummy changes from 
study to study – at the onetime meaning distance to MFI, the other it represents 
treatment groups, next environmental settings – it is not considered in the literature 
review above.   
 
In summary, age is also showing mixed results for micro life insurance uptake. While a 
life-cycle effect and bequest motives based on age are found for the African sample, in 
Sri Lanka no life-cycle effect at all could be found by Bendig and Arun (2011). A 
motive for bequests, however, is suggested due to positive influence of household size 
in Sri Lanka. Regarding the economic household situation, mixed results are reported. 
While wealth is consistently related positive, employment and remittances exhibit 
ambiguous findings. Furthermore, the experience of economic shocks is generally 
positively associated, even if not always significant. For microinsurance, the effect of 
risk aversion is yielding different results. While constantly negative for agricultural 
insurance, it is also found of positive influence for micro life insurance. On the one 
hand, this perhaps suggests that understanding and trust for micro life insurance is more 
straightforward and the insurance product is thus not perceived as risk itself. On the 
other hand, in one study, participation in other social groups in general showed a 
positive sign. Thus, a positive influence of trust proxies – as in the agricultural 
insurance investigations – might also exists on micro life finance uptake. Participation 
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in an alternative credit and savings association was, to the contrary, negatively related – 
suggesting a substituting effect.  
 
5 Methodology 
Based on the previous review of life insurance demand literature and the objectives of 
this thesis, the following chapter expounds the research methodology chosen. First of 
all, the hypotheses tested in this analysis are stated and rationalized. Secondly, the 
micro life insurance product which provides the research opportunity is explained in 
more detail. Thirdly, the mode of research and the data collection process are described. 
Finally, the theoretical framework and research model applied build the fundament for 
the subsequent statistical analysis.  
 
5.1 Hypotheses 
Rooted in the objectives commonly associated with microinsurance and the previously 
reported studies on life insurance demand four hypotheses were formulated. The 
remainder of this subchapter provides the rational why these are considered relevant for 
the uptake of micro life insurance. Furthermore, the variables used and constructed to 
test these hypotheses are described.  
 
5.1.1 Life-cycle effects 
One important characteristic of a household is its current life-cycle stage. The life-cycle 
correlates with the probability of the insured’s death and the level of total consumption 
if the breadwinner survives (Campbell, 1980; Lewis, 1989). Further the dependency of 
children will decrease in later stages of a household’s life-cycle (Hammond et al., 
1967). Hence, it is expected that households in an advanced life-cycle stage are less 
likely to participate in micro life insurance. 
 
 H1 : Life-cycle stage is negatively related to micro life insurance uptake. 
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The age of an insured is often considered an appropriate proxy to test the life-cycle 
effect (Duker, 1969; Ferber & Lee, 1980). However, prior investigations have found 
mixed results for the influence of an insured’s age (cf. Table 1 and Table 2). In the 
microinsurance context, Giesbert et al. (2011) find a positive effect of age and negative 
effect of age squared for their sample from Ghana. Whereas Bendig and Arun (2011) 
find a negative influence of age and a positive effect for age squared in their sample 
from Sri Lanka. Investigating the factor age by itself, therefore, seems not to grasp the 
whole picture.  
In this thesis, the investigation of life-cycle’s effect is extended beyond the examination 
of respondent’s age. In order to test the life-cycle hypothesis an interaction variable is 
constructed. The variable life_cycle is 1 for households with the household head over 
the age of 49 and children over the age of 16 (product age49 * ch_16plus). The value 
for age is chosen because Bendig and Arun (2011) report that an age of 49 was found as 
tipping point for micro life insurance demand. And children over 16 are assumed to be 
less dependent on the income of the household head and even likely to contribute to a 
household’s income in times of hardship. This is supported by dependency definitions 
of the UN.4 
 
5.1.2 Economic Capacity 
Household’s economic characteristics such as income and wealth are highly related to 
life insurance demand (cf. Table 1 & Table 2). They indicate households’ ability to 
afford life insurance and the appropriate amount of insurance protection. In the 
microinsurance context, however, all households are generally of low income and 
wealth levels, many times earning only irregular cash flows (Churchill, 2007). Yet, the 
economic capacity of household differs and is expected to have a positive influence on 
micro life insurance uptake: 
 
 H2 : Economic capacity is positively related to micro life insurance uptake. 
 
Due to characteristics of the microinsurance market, research on microinsurance 
demand already takes different measures into account besides income and wealth. 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology_sheets/demographics/dependency_ratio.pdf 
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Households’ wealth is often included in the analysis. But in contrast to regular 
insurance studies it is not measured as household’s net capital wealth but rather as an 
asset endowment index. Households already owning most of the basic goods which are 
commonly acquired in the low-income peer group, have either more productive assets 
or less need to save for future acquisitions. Liquidity is an important issue in financially 
constrained household. Therefore, ability to access further credit and reception of 
remittances were also investigated in microinsurance demand studies (Giné et al., 2008; 
Giesbert et al., 2011; Bendig & Arun, 2011). The ability to access further credit might 
be an appropriate measurement for a household’s decision to invest in insurance of 
productive assets; however, it is arguably not related to a household’s decision to invest 
in life insurance. And also the examination of remittances produced contradicting 
results so far. It could not be determined if it serves as additional financial resource or 
substitute for insurance (Bendig et al., 2010; Bendig & Arun, 2011). In this thesis, it is 
hypothesized that in the microinsurance context differentiation due to household’s 
economic situation needs to take a different approach. With the – by definition – scarce 
resources microinsurance customers have, the economic capacity of a household needs 
to be assessed differently. Therefore, measurements depicting the free or discretionary 
financial resources of a household are investigated. That is: form of employment, multi-
earner household, relative asset endowment, consumption development and remittances. 
In addition, the payment of remittances by the household is introduced to test the 
influence of economic capacity. The payment of remittances is regarded as a sign that 
the household has a higher economic capacity relatively to the peer group and can thus 
afford remittance payments.  
 
5.1.3 Financial Literacy and Product Understanding 
In the microinsurance literature a lack of understanding for the insurance concept is 
often cited as one of the main reasons for low take up ratios (McCord, 2001; Chankova 
et al., 2008; Ito & Kono, 2010; Bendig & Arun, 2011; PlaNet Finance, 2011). Arguably, 
an understanding for the product is of high importance for the participation decision of a 
household’s decision-maker. Therefore, a positive influence of product understanding 
on life insurance demand is expected. 
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 H3 : Product understanding is positively related to micro life insurance uptake. 
 
In the literature, the effect of education on life insurance demand is often examined and 
consistently found positive (cf. Table 1 & Table 2). It is suggested that higher formal 
education fosters need awareness and the inclination to protect dependents (Hammond 
et al., 1967; Truett & Truett, 1990; Beck & Webb, 2002). Also in the microinsurance 
context it is found that higher education levels increase the uptake of life insurance 
(Chankova et al., 2008; Giné et al., 2008; Giesbert et al., 2011; Bendig & Arun, 2011). 
Particularly, the importance of financial literacy of customers is stressed (McCord, 
2001). Recently, a study found that financial literacy “is one of the strongest and most 
consistent predictors” of financial service demand among low-income households (Cole 
et al., 2010, p. 38). Understanding for the insurance concept itself, was reported as an 
often quoted reason for abstaining from an offered policy (Giné et al., 2008). And a test 
of insurance comprehension on a fictional product showed ambiguous results (Cole et 
al., 2008). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first which undertakes a 
comprehensive survey of product knowledge for the actual product offered and analyzes 
its effect on the micro life insurance purchase decision. Further, respondents’ financial 
literacy is also evaluated for the first time with respect to micro life insurance building 
up on the procedure applied by Cole et al. (2010).  
 
5.1.4 Trust and Experience 
The importance of trust on the demand for financial services in general is shown in 
previous studies (Doherty & Schlesinger, 1990; Guiso et al., 2008). Of all financial 
services, insurance is the one which requires the highest trust levels on the consumer 
side (Churchill, 2000; Cai et al., 2010). It is considered as a crucial factor to the success 
of microinsurance programs (Maleika & Kurakose, 2008). In this thesis, individual trust 
levels and the experience with the provider is expected to have an effect on 
microinsurance uptake. 
 
H4 : High trust levels and a positive experience are positively related to micro    
        life insurance uptake. 
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The importance of trust on microinsurance participation was recognized by previous 
studies on agricultural insurance policies. Measurements related to clients trust 
comprised, for example, endorsement by a trusted person, high-involvement of 
socializers, observation of claim payment, and experiments with sender-receiver trust 
games (Cole, 2008; Cai et al., 2010, Dercon, 2011).  
To assess trust levels of individuals in this research, a Likert-scale type survey was 
utilized. First of all, respondents were asked to indicate their degree of trust in general 
and towards specific groups of persons. Second, a set of questions inquired about the 
respondents experience with the insurance socializer, the MFI, and the insurance 
provider. Third, the membership in a ROSCA-type informal finance group was also 
evaluated and serves as a proxy for trusting others with one’s money. Finally, brand 
recognition was measured to assess if a reputable brand is of positive influence. 
However, causality direction in this respect is not further tested.  
 
The hypothesis regarding life-cycle stage (H1) and economic capacity (H2) are related to 
the characteristics of the household, whereas product understanding (H3) and trust levels 
(H4) are associated with the characteristics of the decision-maker. The data set which 
will be subject to the analysis was generated by the researcher. The following chapter 
describes the background of the data set and provides an overview of the data collection 
process. 
 
5.2 Background and suitability of the researched product 
A crucial requirement for the purpose of the present analysis is the voluntary nature of 
the insurance product offered to the clients. Generally, the most widespread 
microinsurance concept is so called credit-life products which are often mandatory 
attached to the provision of microcredit and, hence, less suited for the examination of 
demand factors. The product subject to this research is a voluntary capital-endowment 
life insurance policy which integrates basic health and life insurance with a saving 
component. The product, Tamadera, was developed by the multinational insurance 
company Allianz. It is actually an adaption from Sarva Shakti Suraksha, a 
microinsurance product which was successfully launched 2008 in India, to the 
Indonesian market. Compared to the product successfully marketed in India, Tamadera 
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has lower death benefits and no interest payments but offers coverage for five defined 
serious illnesses5. Tamadera policyholders pay IDR 10,000 (approx. USD 1.10) weekly 
for a period of five years. During those five years the customer benefits from insurance 
against the five specified, common critical illnesses and death. In either case, the 
beneficiaries receive IDR 2.5mn (approx. USD 272.50) as one-time payout and the 
policy automatically terminates. In case of survival, the insurance plan returns the 
complete savings amount net of interest at maturity. Hence, instead of interests 
customers benefit from a basic health and death protection plan during the policy 
duration. This might be an appealing characteristic to the preponderant Islamic market, 
even though the product is not classified as a takaful insurance and not marketed as 
such. The reason to include critical illness insurance is rather to differentiate the 
offering from the widespread local ROSCA schemes, Arisan, than to cater to 
requirements of Islamic insurance.  
 
The product was introduced in the Indonesian market in the end of 2010. For sales and 
distribution Allianz Life Indonesia cooperated at the time of research with Vision Fund 
Indonesia (VFI). VFI, a subsidiary of the Christian development organization World 
Vision, is striving to empower the enterprising poor and liberate families from poverty. 
The non-profit organization is targeting groups of entrepreneurial women with existing 
microbusinesses and a lack of access to commercial banks to provide microloans 
ranging between USD 50 and USD 600 (average USD 175) in the communities World 
Vision is present (KIVA, 2012, www). In June 2011 VFI served 7,584 MFI clients in 
the Jakarta region. The insurance plan is offered to the institution’s microcredit 
customer base. 
 
The product is socialized by representatives of the MFI to groups of about 5 to 10 
persons. The representatives approach their clients with simple, illustrative material and 
explain the product’s structure before offering them the choice to participate in the five 
year insurance scheme. If people decide to sign up for the insurance product, the MFI 
officers transmit client data electronically to the insurer who in return issues the policy.  
 
                                                 
5
 The serious illnesses covered are Cancer, Heart Attack, Kidney Failure, Major Burns, and Stroke. 
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The launch of this microinsurance product provided a new research opportunity because 
it is the only such voluntary life insurance product for low-income people in Indonesia 
and one of the few products globally that combines death and health benefits with the 
character of a savings products. However, its voluntary nature is the crucial factor for 
the investigation of household demand drivers. 
In addition to the products favorable design for the research interest, Indonesia is 
particularly suitable for commercial pilot studies and can provide a ground for aging 
experience (McCord et al., 2006). Dense population of 117 persons per square kilometer 
and a high literacy rate of 88.5 percent facilitate quick distribution of new 
microinsurance products. Being the 5th largest country worldwide and experiencing 
high economic growth rates make it an attractive market itself. Experiences made in this 
favorable environment can potentially be utilized for the provision of microinsurance 
elsewhere. 
 
In a nutshell, Tamadera is a deposit-cum-insurance scheme distributed via a local and 
trusted partner, has a cap on claim payments, utilizes technology in order to reduce 
costs, and is simply structured and easy to understand (cf. Appendix). Hence, the 
product fulfills many aspects which are considered vital in the literature (Murdoch, 
2002; Akula, 2008). We therefore consider the analysis of the Tamadera product and its 
disbursement appropriate to identify reasons other than product design which influence 
the take-up for new microinsurance products in a typical market environment.  
 
5.3 Data Collection 
In 2011, an own data collection was conducted in Indonesia for the purpose of this 
thesis. The respondents were selected from 56 microfinance groups spread across 24 
different areas in the Jakarta area. In total 208 responses were collected using a 
personally administered, comprehensive questionnaire. Of the 208 respondents 99 
voluntary chose to participate in a microinsurance scheme and 109 abstained from the 
offered product. 
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The decision for an own data collection was due to the lack of available data suited for 
the objective of this research. Furthermore, gathering additional data and diversifying 
data bases is a crucial task in the novel and dynamic field of microinsurance research. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the factors influencing the take-up of 
voluntary microinsurance policies. The above review of relevant literature revealed that 
a variety of demographic, social, and economic factors proved to be influential on a 
household’s life insurance demand in the past. For microeconomic studies on household 
level a comprehensive questionnaire addressing these areas has proved the most 
appropriate tool to gather the required data in previous research (e.g. Hammond et al., 
1967; Duker, 1969; Burnett and Palmer, 1984; Lewis, 1989; Showers and Shotick, 
1994; Bendig et al., 2010; Cole et al., 2008; Bendig and Arun, 2011). 
 
5.3.1 Sample Selection 
The data sample was selected from clients of a microfinance provider, namely Vision 
Fund Indonesia (VFI), who services – at the time of research – approximately 7,500 
MFI clients in the Jakarta region. The sample analyzed in this thesis is thus a subgroup 
of the population targeted by VFI and subject to pre-selection. Being the pilot 
distribution partner in Indonesia, VFI was offering the product as a voluntary choice to 
its existing clients since November 20106. At the time of the field research, the product 
lacked considerably behind its projected sales numbers with a total of 136 clients who 
had paid the weekly premium. Almost three quarters of the insured were interviewed in 
the process of the study and matched by an equal number of persons who chose to 
abstain from the offered microinsurance program. In practice, the product was 
socialized by representatives of the MFI to groups of about 5 to 10 persons of whom 
some decided to participate and others to abstain from the offer. Since the population 
subject to this research did not meet the projected numbers until interviews commenced, 
a high response rate was of particular importance to obtain sufficient data sets for the 
subsequent statistical analysis. The small population required a particular carefulness 
for the selection of interview partners. Therefore, data from the insurance partner and 
distributing MFI was analyzed and such microfinance groups which comprised of 
                                                 
6
 Due to low take up, later it was considered to make the product mandatory for more affluent microcredit 
customers. 
45 
participants and non-participants were primarily selected in order to mitigate bias from 
fixed-effects of the MFI representative, context of socialization or group dynamic 
effects. 
 
5.3.2 Design and Mode of Questionnaire  
As pointed out above, a comprehensive questionnaire was considered to be the most 
appropriate instrument to gather the required data. When designing a questionnaire the 
“experience of those who have gone before” should be utilized (Webb, 2000, p. 197). 
Thus the questionnaire design is based on previous studies in a similar context (Giné et 
al, 2008; Cole et al., 2010) and adjusted for the additional hypotheses which are 
intended to be tested. When formulating the questions, not only the data need according 
to the hypotheses was considered but also social and cultural aspects in order to increase 
the reliability and validity of the given responses. After consultation of academics and 
practitioners, the questionnaire was tested in a pilot study with actual microfinance 
customers and further refined after each round. The final questionnaire consisted of 47 
closed-end questions and 36 Likert-type scaled questions spread over nine pages (cf. 
Appendix). It was divided into four sections: A. Attitude towards microinsurance and 
providers; B. Economic situation of household; C. Product Understanding and Financial 
Literacy; D. Demographic Information.  
Initially, the questionnaire was designed to also address clients’ risk aversion. Risk 
aversion is arguably considered an important determinant of insurance demand and thus 
part of several quantitative studies on microinsurance demand (Bendig et al., 2010; 
Bendig & Arun, 2011; Chankova et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2008; Giesbert et al., 2011; 
Giné et al., 2007). However, reliably surveying respondents’ risk aversion is difficult. In 
the previous studies on micro life insurance demand, respondents were asked for a self-
assessment of their risk-taking behavior or risk behavior (Bendig & Arun, 2011; 
Giesbert et al., 2011). Both studies acknowledge the limitations of this question design, 
yet incorporate it as a proxy for risk aversion in their analysis. Other studies on 
microinsurance in general used a superior but more intricate experimental design (Cole 
et al., 2008; Giné et al., 2007). For the study at hand, a mixture of these methods was 
planned. A question tree regarding the respondents’ time-preference should reveal their 
grasp for time-value of money and risk aversion. However, during the pilot phase this 
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part of the questionnaire proved to be too complex and too much facilitation by the 
interviewer was needed. Therefore, it was removed from the final questionnaire design.  
 
The mode of questionnaire administration had to take the sampling frame, 
characteristics of the target population, and required response rates into consideration. 
The objective of high data reliability and validity was also of high importance regarding 
the way of questionnaire administration. Face-to-face interviews are found to generate 
more valid responses than other survey methods (Belson, 1986). In addition, the specific 
characteristics of the research subjects, who were unfamiliar with answering 
questionnaires and in part showed low literacy levels; as well as the need for high and 
reliable response rates favored the research mode of personally administered, 
questionnaire-based interviews. On the one hand, this research form facilitates the 
understanding of the respondents for the asked questions. On the other hand, it also 
guaranties that questions are answered individually and the importance of genuine 
answers can be stressed and somewhat controlled. A personal administration of 
questionnaires is also expected to increase the response quote from the interviewed 
subjects due to higher involvement of interviewer and interviewee (Yu and Cooper, 
1983). Consequently, the personal administration of questionnaires was regarded as the 
most appropriate way of conducting the data collection. The interviews were conducted 
over a time span of three month. Interpreters were recruited locally to assist with the 
data collection. Before going to the field for the actual data collection, the research 
assistants were made familiar with the questionnaire, learned about the importance of 
independent and genuine data collection, and mock interviews with feedback 
discussions were conducted. The interview sessions were organized with the help of the 
local distribution partner, VFI. Thus it was unavoidable that would perceive an 
affiliation between the interviewers and VFI. However, during the interview process 
itself the interviewers aimed to establish an independent atmosphere and anonymity of 
answers was reassured to the respondents. The fact that interviews were conducted in 
the familiar atmosphere of the respondents’ homes and neighborhoods eased the 
situation further. 
 
Despite careful questionnaire administration, reassurance of the respondent’s anonymity 
and stressing the fact of the importance of genuine answers for this independent 
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academic interview, answering bias due to personal motives cannot be completely 
mitigated. In order to enhance data validity, however, subsequently to the data 
collection process via the comprehensive questionnaire, the gathered data was cross-
checked with client information provided by the MFI and the Insurer.  
 
5.4 Theoretical Framework 
This research on factors influencing the demand for micro life insurance continues in 
the tradition of the research on regular life insurance. Consumers are expected to make 
use of financial markets to level their lifetime consumption by means of savings and 
credit (Ando & Modigliani, 1963). Basically, life insurance contracts can be considered 
as a means of saving (Beck & Webb, 2003). Therefore, it is no surprise that the first 
widely recognized model for life insurance demand by Yaari (1965) takes the works of 
Marshall (1920) and Fisher (1930) on the utility of savings as a starting point. Life 
insurance provides an instrument to reduce uncertainty in a household’s income stream 
due to the death of the breadwinner (Browne & Kim, 1993). Hence, Yaari (1965) 
extends the previous saving models with a provision for income uncertainty, due to 
lifetime uncertainty, in order to explain the demand for life insurance. He argues that for 
a proper evaluation of life insurance demand the context of a consumer’s lifetime 
allocation process must be considered. In his adapted life-cycle model the utility of an 
arbitrary consumption plan U(c) is a function of the consumption c at any time t valued 
by g and discounted by α plus the value of any bequest S at random time of death T 
weighted by β and φ for time and size of bequest respectively. 
 
(1)      
 
In a world where life insurance is available, the consumer is able to separate the 
consumption decision from the bequest decision and the consumption of life insurance 
can be beneficial to an individual who is interested in leaving any bequest (Yaari, 1965). 
The bequest motive is not further expounded in Yaari’s (1965) model. From a 
philosophic, utilitarian view, however, the virtuous behavior is on which increase the 
welfare of all affected individuals (Hume, 1751); and thus an individual can increase his 
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own expected utility by buying a life insurance policy to protect dependents. In Yaari’s 
(1965) model the expected utility of the life insurance purchaser depends on the 
discounted present utility of consumption and the discounted utility of any bequest.  
Lewis (1989) advances this model by incorporating the preferences of dependents in the 
model. He assumes that the breadwinner in a family conducts regular income transfers 
to his dependents. Therefore, the dependents have their own utility function on the 
breadwinner’s uncertain income. Formerly exogenous explanation factors are made 
endogenous and the demand for life insurance can be analyzed according to the 
preferences of dependents. A utility maximizing dependent will prefer that some income 
is allocated to insure the ability of the breadwinner to generate non-capital income 
(Lewis, 1989). In the maximization problem (Equation 2), F is the face value of all 
insurance contracts written on the breadwinner’s life. The probability of the 
breadwinner’s death is written as p. The loading factor of insurance is noted as l. And 
the dependents’ risk aversion is accounted for in δ. TC stands for the present value of 
dependents’ total consumption in case the breadwinner survives and, finally, W is the 
household’s net wealth. 
 
(2)     
 
In this model five factors explain the demand for life insurance: (i) policy loading factor 
l, (ii) probability of breadwinner’s death p, (iii) household’s risk aversion δ, (iv) net 
wealth W, and (v) total transfer of wealth on dependents TC. While the policy loading 
factor is subject to actuarial calculations, the other factors can be inferred from socio-
economic characteristics of households (Lewis, 1989).  
More recently and adequately for the microfinance context, Ginè et al. (2008) provided 
a framework regarding the demand for rainfall index insurance in rural India. The 
determining factors here are: (i) risk aversion, (ii) size of risk exposure, (iii) correlation 
between risk insured and insurance payout, (iv) high actuarial value of insurance, and 
(v) financial constraints of household. Their one-period model is based on the 
assumption of symmetric information and thus neglects effects of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. The concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection from new 
institutional economics play a crucial role in the insurance market. Various 
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contributions (e.g. Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976; Cawley & Philipson, 1996) assign them 
a hampering effect for the development of insurance markets. Bendig and Arun (2011) 
consider adverse selection and moral hazard problematic in the context of micro life 
insurance since the insurer is disadvantaged in assessing the individual’s death 
probability at reasonable costs ex ante and the insured’s risk taking behavior might 
changes ex post. Murdoch (1995), however, argues that life insurance is particularly 
suited to explore new markets because of low adverse selection and moral hazard 
effects and easy verification of claim legitimacy. Therefore, adverse selection and moral 
hazard considerations are excluded from the scope of this analysis.  
The theoretical model applied in this thesis follows the approach by Bendig and Arun 
(2011) which is rooted in the described models of Lewis (1989) and Giné et al. (2008). 
Bendig and Arun (2011) argue that a household’s participation in a microinsurance 
scheme is conditional on its wealth status (w), other household characteristics (Z), 
personal characteristics of the household’s decision maker (H), regional characteristics 
(R), and an uncovariant error term (u). Thus the probability that a household participates 
in an offered insurance scheme is described with the following equation: 
 
(3)     
 
The dependent variable in this econometric analysis is of binary form: either the 
respondent is participating (1) or is not participating (0) in the offered insurance 
scheme. Therefore, the common ordinary least square (OLS) regression method cannot 
produce the best linear unbiased estimator and is not applied. In fact, a maximum 
likelihood estimation method is apt for the analysis at hand. The binary probit function 
used is: 
 
(4)     
 
with  if the respondent is participating in the insurance scheme and  if the 
respondent is not participating. 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on life insurance demand and reported a set 
of standard explanatory variables which have become widely accepted and repeatedly 
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tested in empirical investigations. Therefore, they will be included in the econometric 
analysis in this thesis. In addition, this paper wants to explore a set of variables which 
are expected to influence the factors of the above model for insurance participation, 
related to the household characteristics (Z) and the characteristics of the decision-maker 
(H). The additional areas under investigation can be clustered into four categories: (i) 
life-cycle effects and (ii) economic capacity of the household Z, (iii) product 
understanding and (iv) trust of the respondent H. In the following chapter, firstly, the 
collected data is described and, secondly, a marginal effect probit regression analysis is 
conducted. 
 
6 Empirical Results and Analysis  
In this chapter, the data sample collected is analyzed and tested for the hypotheses 
stated above. To begin with, a statistical description of the collected data provides an 
overview and understanding for the sample. Subsequently, the data set is regressed on 
insurance participation of the interviewed sample. A marginal effect probit regression is 
reported to allow for evaluation of the individual variables’ effect.  
 
6.1 Data Description 
The data collection process yielded an array of data from microinsurance participants 
and non-participants. Before the above expounded hypotheses are tested applying 
econometric analysis, a sound understanding for the sample and its characteristics is 
expedient. Therefore, in the following an overview of the data set is given using 
descriptive statistics. The data comprises a sample of 208 microfinance customers in the 
greater Jakarta area. Respondents from 56 different MFI groups were interviewed in 25 
different locations. The selection of groups interviewed was driven by two objectives: 
firstly, to prefer groups which consisted of participants and non-participants; secondly, 
to achieve parity of the two strata. The majority of the respondents live in an urban 
surrounding (83.7 percent). All 208 interviewed individuals were offered to participate 
in the microinsurance scheme according to the information provided by Vision Fund 
Indonesia. However, 12 respondents claimed that they were never offered any insurance 
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scheme. Ultimately, 99 (47.6 percent) respondents voluntary decided to take part in the 
offered micro life endowment insurance scheme, namely Tamadera.  
 
Demographics 
Evaluating the demographic characteristics of respondents reveals that the sample is 
skewed for gender with 91 percent of respondents being female. This is mainly due to 
the lending policy of the MFI, who preferably lends to groups of women due to better 
repayment experiences. Similarly, Bendig et al. (2010) finds that women represent the 
preferred target groups for MFI’s due to higher social connectivity in groups and 
incentive to provide security to their families. The gender distribution in this sample is 
close to the distribution in the MFI’s total client base of 7,582 persons (89.1 percent 
female).The average respondent is 39.3 years of age (Standard Error (SE) 0.61), Muslim 
(90.9 percent) and married (86.5 percent). For comparison, the average age for 
Indonesia is 28.2 years and 86.1 percent are Muslim (CIA Factbook, 2011). Most 
respondents consider themselves to be rather religious with a standardized average score 
of 0.83 (SE 0.01) on three Likert-scale type indicators. The typical household size is 
4.51 persons (SE 0.11) with 2.72 children (SE 0.11). The household’s children are in 
average 17.3 years old and spend 8.3 educational years in school. The mean for 
respondents’ years of schooling is 9.92 (SE 0.22). A difference between the two strata 
suggests general higher education of insurance participants with 10.2 (SE 0.32) school 
years and non-participants with 9.68 (SE 0.31) respectively. Consequently, the 
proportion of participants with secondary or higher education exceeds that of non-
participants by 13 percent (cf. Table 3). 
 
Financial Literacy and Product Knowledge 
One focus of this thesis is to better encompass how education and knowledge relate to 
the participation in microinsurance offers. Therefore, in addition to educational levels of 
respondents, their grasp of mathematical and financial concepts as well as their 
individual knowledge of the microinsurance product offered is evaluated. 
Formal education of individuals is expected to be related to financial literacy. And, 
indeed, a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.27 between formal education and financial 
literacy scores is found (cf. Appendix: Table 19). The financial literacy of interviewees 
was tested using a set of seven questions on fundamental mathematical and financial 
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concepts such as: (i) summation, (ii) distraction, (iii) multiplication, (iv) percentages, 
(v) diversification, (vi) interest, and (vii) inflation. The questions applied to test 
respondents’ knowledge on these concepts are taken from the Harvard Business School 
questionnaire used by Cole et al. (2010) and adjusted for the survey context. The 
relative amount of interviewees’ correct answers is reported in the table 3 below. 
Results show that insurance participants consistently achieve higher financial literacy 
scores than non-participants. Only in the area of diversification the group of non-
participants performed slightly better.  
To assess the sample’s understanding for fundamental insurance concepts in general and 
specific attributes of the product at hand in particular, six closed-end questions were 
included in the survey (cf. Appendix: 9.3 Questionnaire). Insurance participants 
performed better in all six knowledge areas (cf. Table 3). On the question regarding 
which five events constitute a termination of the insurance policy, insurance participants 
could identify in average 2.72 (SE 0.14) events and non-participants 2.33 (SE 0.16) 
events. Asked to name the five critical illnesses insured under Tamadera participants 
recalled 1.91 (SE 0.16) and non-participants 1.59 (SE 0.14) respectively. The question 
on how much the product will yield in the end of the five year term was answered 
correct by 43.3 percent of non-insured and 45.5 percent of the insured interviewees. 
When inquired about the financial effect of an insurance claim, 71.7 percent of 
participants returned the correct answer and 58.1 percent of non-participants. 
Particularly, interesting is the result on the lock-in period of the insurance. Anecdotal 
and analytical evidence suggests that the five year term of Tamadera is a too long 
period to commit to and a main reason deciding against the product (cf. Appendix: 
Table 18). Thus an understanding of the possibility to opt out of the scheme could have 
a mitigating influence. And, indeed, the question on fund lock-in period reveals that 
38.5 percent of non-participants believe that they can get their paid in funds back only 
after the course of five years. However, even 47.5 percent of the participants believe in 
such a long lock-in period. The correct answer – 12 months – is given by 23.1 and 25.3 
percent of non-participants and participants respectively. The last question on the 
appropriate cancelation fee was answered correct by 55.2 percent of non-participants 
and 59.6 percent of participants. Based on all answers, a product knowledge score was 
constructed to reflect the understanding of the respondents for the offered product. The 
mean for this indicator is 0.43 (SE 0.02) for persons abstaining from Tamadera and 0.49 
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(SE 0.02) for participants. The level of significance of difference for this indicator is 
significant at the 5 percent level (cf. Table 11).  
 
 
 
Occupation 
Commonly, also economic characteristics of households are investigated as explanatory 
factors for life insurance participation (cf. Chapter 4). In the present study, a set of data 
was collected in order to analyze the economic capacity of sample households. These 
comprise occupation of household earners, household’s average daily expenses as a 
proxy for income, and asset endowment of respondents’ households. In addition, the 
interviewed MFI clients were asked about any remittances they pay or receive and their 
personal perception of development regarding their household’s economic situation.  
With respect to occupation, respondents were asked to indicate to which out of six 
typical job categories they and their spouse are associated with. The categories were 
Table 3: Education, financial literacy, and product knowledge of respondents 
  
Non-Participants Participants 
Higher Education 69.7% 82.8% 
Financial Literacy 
  Summation  81.0% 92.9% 
Distraction 81.0% 84.8% 
Multiplication 60.0% 70.7% 
Percentages 45.3% 59.6% 
Diversification 29.2% 26.3% 
Interest 83.0% 90.9% 
Inflation 37.8% 51.5% 
Product Knowledge  
 Termination Events (average out of 6)+ 2.33 2.72 
Coverage (average out of 5)+ 1.59 1.91 
Product Yield 43.3% 45.5% 
Claim Benefit 58.7% 71.7% 
Lock-in Period 23.1% 25.3% 
Cancelation Fee 55.8% 59.6% 
Note: Table states the portion of respondents who have secondary or higher education and who answered the 
corresponding questions for financial literacy and product knowledge correctly in percent; all items separated for 
the non-participants and participants strata. 
+
 average correct answers 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
54 
Employee, Trader, Farmer, Food Stall, Housewife, or Production of Goods. If they 
could not associate themselves with one of these categories, the option to name another 
profession was provided. Being an entrepreneur was repeatedly mentioned and is thus 
reported in addition to the six categories. The overview in table 4 shows that the 
respondents themselves mainly fall into the category of being either a Trader or a 
Housewife. This result has to be considered together with the fact that 91 percent of 
sample is female due to the marketing policy of the partnering MFI. Divergence 
between Tamadera participants and non-participants are minor. The female spouse’s 
income mainly seems to stem from petty trade and serves as complementary financial 
resource. For the spouses – that is mainly the male breadwinner of the family – 
differences are somewhat more striking (cf. Table 4). In the group of participants 19.7 
percent more employees and 13.2 percent less traders are found. These results hint at a 
distinct influence of regular income streams and working capital needs on the 
participation in the microinsurance scheme.  
 
 
 
Income 
The level of income is one of the most important predictors of life insurance 
consumption found in the literature review above. However, since income is rather a 
personal matter, not readily shared, and often subject to considerable fluctuations 
among the microinsurance target group, the questionnaire asked for average daily 
Table 4: Occupations in sample households  
Occupation  Respondent Spouse 
  Non-Participant Participant Non-Participant Participant 
Employee 6.5% 10.1% 34.1% 53.8% 
Trader 45.4% 50.5% 33.0% 19.8% 
Farmer 1.9% 0.0% 3.3% 1.1% 
Foodstall 10.2% 9.1% 4.4% 2.2% 
Housewife 26.9% 25.3% 0.0% 4.4% 
Production 1.9% 3.0% 2.2% 2.2% 
Entrepreneur 3.7% 0.0% 11.0% 7.7% 
Other 3.7% 2.0% 12.1% 8.8% 
Note: Table states main occupations found in sample households segregated for respondent and respondent’s 
spouse and the non-participant and participant strata. 
Source: Author’s Calculation. 
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expenses instead. This is in line with the World Bank approach to measure poverty 
levels as daily consumption and not income (Coudouel et al., 2002). In order to allow 
for an analysis of dynamic effects of consumption levels, the questionnaire asked for the 
average daily expenses of the past five years. Of course, the report of consumption 
levels of past years is subject to bias of the interviewee’s ability to remember exact 
numbers for several years ago. However, the collected data for past years can still serve 
as an indicator of the direction of consumption development. The development of 
average daily expenses for both groups over the last five years is shown in figure 2. 
 
  
 
The above exhibit reveals that the income development for both groups is positive for 
the period from 2006 to 2010. However, the compounded average growth rate (CAGR) 
of consumption is noticeably higher for participants (13.7 percent) than non-participants 
(10.3 percent) and well above average inflation of consumer prices (6.5 percent) 7.  
                                                 
7
 Inflation rates are retrieved from http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/indonesia/inflation-
indonesia.aspx  (02/01/2012). 
Figure 2: Average growth rate of daily expenses 
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Note: The figure depicts the average growth rate of daily expenses separated for the non-participants and 
participants strata and benchmarked against the average annual inflation for each year between 2007 and 
2010. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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In absolute numbers the group of participants spends in average IDR 67,310 per day 
(USD 7.5) and non-participants IDR 58,430 per day (USD 6.5) in 2010. In the average 
household this constitutes daily expenses of USD 1.66 and USD 1.41 per capita for 
participants and non-participants respectively. The development of consumption during 
the last year is significantly different for both groups at the five percent level (cf. Table 
11). Insurance participants experienced an increase of daily expenditures of IDR 10,778 
(USD 1.20), whereas expenditures of non-participants only increased by IDR 5,495 
(USD 0.61) during the same period. 
 
Asset Endowment 
The asset endowment of households was also subject to the survey. The respondents 
were asked to indicate which of nine assets their household possesses. The list 
comprised a set of assets of different value and commonly desired and acquired by 
Indonesian households. Namely these are: Power Supply, Clean Water Dispenser, 
Fridge, Mobile Phone, TV, Motorcycle, Computer, Car, and House. The investigation 
revealed that asset endowment of participants is relatively higher in all categories (cf. 
Table 5). Only regarding housing property the relative ownership in the non-participant 
strata is slightly higher. For further analysis, the asset data was aggregated and an 
equally weighted asset endowment index (AE_ix) was constructed. The index value is 
0.60 (SE 0.02) for non-participants and 0.67 (SE 0.02) for participants with a level of 
significance of difference significant at the 1 percent level (cf. Table 11).  
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Remittance 
Previous work on the uptake of microinsurance recognized the role of remittances; 
though, with mixed results. The study by Giesbert et al. (2011) in Ghana found that 
remittances received by a household have a significant (p<0.05), negative influence on 
microinsurance participation, whereas Bendig and Arun (2011) found a significant 
(p<0.05), positive effect. Suggested interpretation of these results were either that 
remittances work as a kind of substitute for insurance products (Giesbert et al., 2011) or 
that they provide an additional resource which can be allocated to microinsurance 
participation (Bendig & Arun, 2011). In the literature, so far, only the role of 
remittances received by a household was considered. In this study, additionally the role 
of payment of remittances by a household is examined. As these could either have a 
negative effect due to the outflow of funds or, as hypothesized in this thesis, have a 
positive effect since it is an indicator of relatively higher economic capacity of a 
household. Therefore, survey subjects were asked about any remittances they receive or 
pay and the monthly value in IDR of these. The results differentiated for the group of 
Tamadera participants and non-participants are reported in table 6 below. 
 
Table 5: Asset endowment of sample households 
Asset Endowment Non-Participant Participant 
Electricity* 92.5% 94.9% 
Clean Water Dispenser 53.8% 66.3% 
Fridge 74.3% 84.8% 
Mobile  75.2% 88.9% 
TV 95.4% 98.0% 
Motorcycle 67.9% 81.8% 
Computer 21.1% 26.3% 
Car 4.6% 7.1% 
House 59.6% 58.6% 
*Respondents living in boarding houses may not have their own electrical connection. 
Note: Table shows the portion of sample households which own the stated assets in percent and separated for 
non-participants and participants strata. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
58 
 
 
The table 6 above shows an equal distribution of remittance reception across both 
groups. Yet, the value of remittances received is considerably higher for microinsurance 
partakers. Regarding the payment of remittances, however, it shows that nine percent 
more of the Tamadera participants are paying remittances to other households. And also 
the value of the remittances paid is higher than for the non-participating households. A 
possible inference from this in light of the results by Giesbert et al. (2011) and Bendig 
& Arun (2011) might be that influence of remittances received depends on the value of 
them. For lower values they serve as a substitute to microinsurance, however, once a 
certain threshold is exceeded they are regarded as additional financial resource fostering 
microinsurance participation. A better indicator for households’ economic capacity 
might be their payment of remittances as a sign of economic capacity in excess of 
personal needs.  
 
Economic Shocks 
Besides economic capacity, another conceivable factor influencing the demand for 
insurance is the previous experience of materialized risks. Previous work on 
microinsurance demand investigated the influence of the experience of death, illness or 
other severe shocks to the household. In Ghana a positive but non-significant effect for 
death and illness and non-significant, negative for other shocks was found (Giesbert et 
al., 2011). In Sri Lanka a positive, non-significant influence was found for death 
experience and a negative and significant effect for severe illnesses or other shocks 
(Bendig & Arun, 2011). For this study, data was collected regarding the influence of the 
experience of death, illness, flood, fire, and tuition payments. Table 7 shows that most 
Table 6: Remittances paid and received 
Remittances 
Non-Participants Participants 
Received 12% 13% 
Mean Value                  479,167  1,179,286   
Paid 6% 15% 
Mean Value 221,429        392,667 
Note: The table states the portion of respondents who received and/or paid remittances in percent as well as 
the mean value of these payments per household in IDR separated for non-participants and participants strata. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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households were affected by tuition payments in the past (NP 69.7 percent / P 67.7 
percent). However, for none of the risk events a significant level of difference could be 
found. Absolute numbers, though, show that 6.4 percent more households of participant 
had the experience of death in their household.  
 
 
Demand Research 
In many countries microinsurance market research was conducted which tested prior to 
product conception and piloting of microinsurance policies if a demand exists. These 
studies usually use qualitative tools, like interviews with the target population and focus 
group discussions, to assess demand for certain insurance products. A study conducted 
by the GTZ, UNDP, and Allianz for Indonesia in 2006, revealed five major risks people 
are concerned about: (i) serious illness, (ii) education costs, (iii) loss of harvest, (iv) 
death of a relative, and (v) accidents (McCord et al., 2006). Part of the questionnaire in 
the survey underlying this thesis asked people about their interest in certain insurance 
products. The motivation for this question is to investigate if ex ante statements made 
about interest in certain insurance products – as it is typically done in demand studies – 
are corresponding with actual microinsurance take-up. The questionnaire asked the 
respondents to rate on a 7-point Likert-scale their interest in five different insurance 
products, namely Health, House, Education, Motorcycle/ Assets, and Life insurance. 
This question was asked in an early part of the questionnaire before respondents were 
asked about their participation in Tamadera to mitigate that respondents are influenced 
by their earlier answers given. The results are differentiated for the two groups 
interviewed and means reported in figure 3 below. 
Table 7: Shock experience of sample households 
Shock Experience   
  Non-Participants Participants 
Death 13.8% 20.2% 
Serious Illness 11.9% 14.1% 
Flood 24.8% 22.2% 
Fire 5.5% 3.0% 
Tuition 69.7% 67.7% 
Note: The table states the portion of households which experienced the indicated shocks separated for non-
participants and participants strata.  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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The graph shows that participants indeed report a higher interest in insurance products 
across all product types. While this difference was particularly strong for asset and life 
insurance with a level of significance of difference of 3 percent and below 1 percent 
respectively, it also shows that the interest in health and education insurance was high 
across the whole sample (Mean 0.79 / SE 0.02). This result suggests that the indicated 
interest in insurance products indeed corresponds with actual participation rates. 
Noteworthy, however, one question remains: 21 percent of non-participants reported a 
high interest in a life insurance product, yet decided to abstain from participating in the 
offered product.  
 
Trust and Client Experience 
Trust is deemed a highly relevant factor regarding individual’s participation in financial 
markets (cf. Doherty & Schlesinger, 1990; Guiso et al., 2008). It is one objective of this 
thesis to examine if an individual’s degree of trust in third-parties and, particularly, the 
players involved in the microinsurance transaction influences the respondent’s decision 
to participate in the offer. Firstly, to assess the degree of trust an array of Likert-items 
Figure 3: Interest in insurance products 
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Note: The graph depicts the respondents’ subjective interest in given insurance products indicated on a 7-point-
Likert scale and standardized between 1 and 0 separated for the non-participants and participants strata. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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regarding individual’s trust and experience with the involved parties, namely the 
socializer, the MFI, and the insurer, is asked (cf. Appendix: 9.3 Questionnaire). 
Secondly, respondents brand recognition is examined since a strong brand can be 
associated with trust. Finally, the interviewed microfinance customers were asked how 
long they cooperate with the MFI and if they participate and informal financial saving 
scheme as well. 
Results show that microinsurance participants in average exhibit higher degree of trusts 
towards other people (cf. Table 8). Significant in a t-test for level of significance of 
difference revealed the degree towards relatives (5 percent level) and the insurer (10 
percent level). Also the respondents’ experience with the socializer is significantly 
different (5 percent level) and better for the group of microinsurance participants. While 
the experience with the MFI and attitude towards it is not significant it also shows a 
higher mean value for the insurance buyers. And, finally, the attitude towards the 
insurer is suggested to be significantly different (1 percent level) and more benevolent 
for the group of participants. 
 
 
Table 8: Trust and experience of respondents 
Ordinal Variables Non-Participants Participants Full Sample t-Test 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Pr(|T|>|t|) 
Trust               
General 0.48 0.03 0.45 0.02 0.46 0.02 0.44 
Neighbors 0.54 0.03 0.55 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.81 
Friends 0.63 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.63 0.02 0.74 
Relatives 0.73 0.02 0.80 0.02 0.76 0.01 0.01 
Work colleagues 0.55 0.03 0.59 0.02 0.57 0.02 0.31 
MFI 0.78 0.02 0.80 0.02 0.79 0.01 0.56 
Insurer 0.70 0.02 0.76 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.05 
Experience 
  
    
 
    
Socializer Index 0.76 0.02 0.82 0.02 0.79 0.01 0.01 
MFI Index 0.80 0.01 0.82 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.11 
Insurer Index 0.74 0.02 0.82 0.01 0.78 0.01 0.00 
Note: The table states the respondents’ subjectively rated trust levels in general and for certain groups of people 
and their perception of the experience with the institutions involved in the sales process indicated on a 7-point-
Likert scale. All values are standardized and separated for non-participants, participants, and the full sample. 
Further, the t-test statistic for level of significance of difference is reported. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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To assess the respondents’ ability to recall the brand name of the insurer, they were 
asked to pick one brand name out of a list of four well-known insurers in the Indonesian 
market (cf. Appendix: 9.3 Questionnaire). Results show 56.9 percent of non-participants 
and 78.8 percent of participants were able to name the correct brand. The “Do not 
know” option was chosen by 10.1 percent of non-participants and 3.0 percent of buyers. 
However, the results are subject to ex post bias since respondents who decided for the 
insurance received a certificate of insurance which boldly stated the brand name of the 
insurer. Causality, therefore, cannot be reliably determined.  
Further, people were asked how long they already have a credit relationship with the 
MFI. It showed that the group of non-participants in average cooperated with the MFI 
for 9.8 months (SE 0.88) and Tamadera clients for 11.0 months (SE 1.31). A longer 
tenure with the MFI per se can arguably be regarded as trust increasing characteristic. 
On the one hand, since the behavior of the other party feels more familiar it increases 
comfort of making business with each other. On the other hand, the fact of continuing to 
work together is a sign of trust in the MFI. In practice, the new insurance product was 
predominantly marketed to clients who either received a new loan or renewed an 
existing one. Thus, this result reported here has to be treated with care. Actual influence 
of MFI tenure might even be stronger.  
 
ROSCA participation 
Lastly, the participation in informal financial groups – so called Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCA) – is deemed as a sign of trust with ones money in third 
parties. Also in a ROSCA “participants take a chance by placing their money in one 
another’s hand” (Fessler, 2002, pp. 29/30). An investigation of ROSCA participation in 
the sample yielded that 67.0 percent of non-participants and 72.7 of participants took 
part in at least one ROSCA. If people are participating in a ROSCA, in average they are 
participating in 1.6 informal saving groups. The maximum for one single person, 
however, is participation in five different ROSCAs. Differentiated for non-participants 
and participants the average group participation is 1.47 and 1.76 respectively. 
Contributions to the ROSCA differ from group to group. For the strata of non-
participants the mean monthly payment to ROSCAs is IDR 182,383.60 (SE 43,434.32; 
USD 20.25) and for insurance participants IDR 168,661.80 (SE 26,118.82; USD 18.72). 
While Tamadera customers in average take part in more different ROSCA groups they 
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put less money in these schemes. This could suggest that they are more wary to put ‘all 
eggs in one basket’; but also that they are more ready to trust their money into someone 
else’s hands.  
Regarding the question if income spend on insurance actually competes with money 
spend on ROSCA groups, 42.5 and 31.9 percent of non-participants and participants 
respectively said they did plan to reduce their ROSCA contributions as a result of 
engaging in microinsurance. However, at a later stage in the questionnaire only the 
participants were asked again if they actually reduced their ROSCA participation since 
starting Tamadera. An actual reduction of ROSCA contributions is reported by 23.9 
percent (cf. Table 9). The majority of 74.6 percent can still not decide if they should opt 
out the ROSCA scheme and answered with Maybe in the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
Fund Application 
An interesting observation was made regarding the respondents’ plan on what they want 
to use the financial services offered by the MFI for. While for the application of MFI 
credit the overriding plan was to use funds for investments in working capital (46.8 
percent NP / 54.8 percent P), the Tamadera customers reported they want to use the 
proceeds of the micro endowment life insurance after five years to invest in education of 
children (67 percent). Of course, framing of the product has to be taken into account: 
the insurance product is sold as one way to protect the family and save up for education 
of children which could distort responses. 
 
Table 9: ROSCA reduction when participating in microinsurance 
ROSCA Reduction Non-Participants Participants 
Intended Intended Actual 
yes 42.5% 31.9% 23.9% 
maybe 38.4% 38.9% 74.6% 
no 19.2% 29.2% 1.5% 
Note: The table states separated for non-participants and participants strata the intention of respondents to 
reduce participation in Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCA) given the participation in 
microinsurance. For participants also their actual decision on ROSCA spending following microinsurance 
participation is collected. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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In this chapter data collected in the client interviews was summarized and described. 
The data description revealed that there are significant differences between the group of 
non-participants and participants with respect to a number of factors (cf. Table 11). 
Respondents’ age and number of dependents does not yield significant differences for 
both groups. However, the t-statistics for the interaction life-cycle variable which is 
based on these two factors and constructed to test for hypothesis 1 expounded above, 
exhibits a significant difference at the five percent level. Further, the variables related to 
individual’s product understanding, namely formal education, financial literacy, and 
product knowledge, all present with significant difference levels.  
From the factors expected to be related to households’ economic capacity only 
employment, asset endowment, consumption development, and payment of remittances 
significantly differ for the two groups. The experience of shocks did not yield the 
expected differences; however, the microinsurance customers had more experience with 
death inside their family. The interest expressed by respondents in insurance product 
corresponds with the actual decision-making. Finally, data gathered on trust levels and 
proxies for individuals are in line with the hypothesis of having a positive influence on 
microinsurance uptake. In the next chapter, the above introduced variables will be 
included in an econometric regression model to test the hypothesis stated in chapter 5.  
 
 
Table 10: Application of financial services 
Product Application 
Non-Participants Participants 
Credit Credit Insurance 
Working Capital 46.8% 54.8% 21.0% 
Children Education  22.8% 17.8% 67.0% 
Other 30.0% 27.0% 12.0% 
Note: The table states for which purpose respondents’ plan to use the funds from their microcredit facility and 
their microinsurance savings respectively, separated for non-participants and participants strata. . 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 11: Summary statistics for explanatory variables  
Variable Participants 
Mean 
Non-Participants 
Mean 
Level of significance of 
difference, if any (%) 
Full Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. N 
Age 39.394 39.238 
 
39.313 0.612 21 71 208 
Dependents 2.647 2.796 
 
2.725 1.591 0 9 208 
Education+ 0.828 0.697 5 0.760 0.428 0 1 208 
Location 0.869 0.807   0.837 0.371 0 1 208 
Life-Cycle+ 0.091 0.193 5 0.144 0.352 0 1 208 
Employee+ 0.556 0.321 1 0.433 0.497 0 1 208 
Multi-Earner Household+ 0.707 0.734 
 
0.721 0.450 0 1 208 
Asset Endowment 0.672 0.600 1 0.635 0.187 0 1 208 
Consumption Development 10.778 5.495 5 8.010 16.555 -50 150 208 
Remittance – received+ 0.141 0.119 
 
0.130 0.337 0 1 208 
Remittance – paid+ 0.162 0.064 5 0.111 0.314 0 1 208 
Financial Literacy 0.672 0.598 1 0.634 0.193 0 1 203 
Product Knowledge 0.486 0.432 5 0.459 0.184 0 1 203 
Trust Degree 0.654 0.626 
 
0.640 0.147 0 1 199 
Client Experience 0.821 0.769 1 0.794 0.108 0 1 197 
ROSCA Participation 1.296 1.029 10 11.584 1.053 0 5 202 
MFI Tenure 11.030 9.798 
 
10.385 11.170 1 58 208 
Brand Recognition+ 0.788 0.591 1 0.686 0.465 0 1 204 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0.  
Note: Definitions for explanatory variables included in the analysis are: Age of respondent measured in years; Dependents’ number in household; Education of respondent is secondary or higher level; Location of 
respondent is in urban environment; Life-Cycle as interaction variable between respondent’s age over 49 and has children over 16; Employee indicates formal employment of respondent or spouse; Multi-Earner Household 
are households with more than one breadwinner; Asset Endowment is an index value for number of common assets owned by household; Consumption Development defined as difference in IDR between households daily 
consumption value today and one year before; Remittance - received indicates household receives regular payments from relatives; Remittance – paid indicates household pays regular payments to relatives; Financial 
Literacy is an index value based on the respondent's ability to answer a set of financial literacy assessing questions; Product Knowledge is an index value based on the respondent's ability to answer a set of questions 
related to the previously offered product correctly; Trust Degree is an index value based on the respondent's own trust assessment in general and towards specific groups of persons on a 7-point Likert scale; Client 
Experience  is an index value based on the respondent's own experience and attitude assessment towards the socializer, the MFI, and the Insurer on a 7-point Likert scale; ROSCA Participation states number of informal 
financial groups the respondent is participating in; MFI Tenure is the number of months the respondents is already cooperating with the MFI which offers the microinsurance plan; Brand Recognition for respondents’ ability 
to recognize brand name of insurance partner. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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6.2 Probit Regression Model and Discussion of Results 
In this section, the previously described data sample is examined using econometric 
analysis to identify the socio-economic determinants of micro life insurance 
participation. Firstly, the choice of econometric analysis instrument is explained and 
rationalized. Subsequently, the regression results for the control variables and the 
investigated hypotheses are reported and interpreted.  
6.2.1 Choice of econometric analysis instrument 
When the dependent variable is dichotomous, commonly, either a logit or a probit 
regression model is applied to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables. 
Basically, both estimation techniques return similar results (Chambers & Cox, 1967). 
Earlier studies on the uptake of microinsurance, however, tend to prefer the probit 
regression (e.g. Giné et al., 2008; Giesbert et al., 2011; Bendig & Arun, 2011). Thus, to 
pander comparison with previous studies, in this thesis also a probit estimation model is 
applied.  
 
The binominal probit model is generally denoted as 
 
(5)     
 
 (Wooldridge, 2000). In the model applied here,  represents the binary response 
variable either taking the value of 0 for non-participants and 1 for microinsurance 
participants. The regressions constant value is described by  and  represent the 
coefficients for the according variable . An error term is also included in the 
equation. In a probit model it is assumed that error terms are independent and normally 
distributed. The probit estimation is based on a standard normal distribution of 
observations; whereas a logit regression makes use of the logistic distribution function 
which is flatter in its tails. Using an iterative maximum likelihood process, the 
binominal probit regression estimates the coefficients, β, which maximize the 
probability of observing the given sample.  
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However, probit regression is not assuming a linear relationship between the response 
variable and the regressors. The estimated coefficients β, hence, provide no direct 
measure of a variables effect. The direction of the effect can be inferred from the sign of 
the coefficient, yet the size is unclear. Brooks (2008) describes a method to make 
interpretation of coefficients more meaningful. The marginal effect a one unit change of 
any variable has on the probability of Y=1 can be calculated, but it is different for every 
person. Therefore, the model coefficients are scaled at its mean and, subsequently, can 
be interpreted as the marginal effect a one unit change of the independent variable from 
the sample mean – ceteris paribus – has on the probability of Y=1. Interpreting the 
marginal effects coefficients, it needs to be distinct for discrete and continuous variables 
x. For continuous variables the coefficient provides the percental change an 
infinitesimal alteration of x has on the probability that Y=1. For discrete variables, 
however, the coefficient denotes the change in probability that Y=1 if the discrete 
variable switches from 0 to 1.  
In order to identify which variables have a statistically significant effect, a z-statistic is 
modeled. This z-statistic is a standardized value calculated as the raw score of x minus 
the population mean divided by the population standard deviation. The z-statistics are 
the same for the binominal probit regression model estimating probit coefficients and 
the one estimating marginal effects. 
 
The explanatory power of a binominal probit model – as measured by the F-statistic for 
OLS regression – can also be assessed. Generally, a Chi²-distribution test for model fit 
is utilized. This test statistic analyzes the probability that all regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero and, hence, whether the model as a whole is statistically 
significant. 
Several attempts were made to develop a coefficient of determination for probit 
regression – as the R² represents for the analytical OLS regression – to measure a 
model’s goodness of fit. This coefficient of determination should measure how much of 
Y’s variance is explained by the regression model. Commonly, McFadden’s Pseudo R² 
is used in binominal probit regressions. In maximum likelihood estimations this statistic 
is not of much value on an absolute basis. Yet, it can serve as a relative measure to 
compare the various models estimated in this thesis.  
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In addition, each of the four estimated models is tested for multicollinearity by using a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis. To mitigate effects of any heteroskedasticity a 
robust probit regression model is estimated. 
 
6.2.2 Control variables included in the model 
In accordance with previous quantitative studies on life insurance demand (cf. Chapter 
4), a set of standard variables is considered in the model. However, the variables 
regarding gender, marital status, and religion were excluded from the analysis due to the 
nature of the sample. As described above 90.1 percent of the sample were female, 86.5 
percent married, and 91.3 percent Muslim, thus these distributions are considered too 
skewed to provide meaningful results. Yet, they depict standard characteristics of the 
Indonesian microfinance market. The control variables kept for further analysis 
comprise age, number of dependents, education and location. An univariate marginal 
effects probit regression suggests a positive influence of age (β=0.0005), number of 
dependents (0.0150), urban location (0.1119), and education (0.1790) (cf. Table 16). A 
statistical significant effect at the 5 percent level is only found for education. The 
positive, significant effect of education on micro life insurance demand confirms prior 
results by Giesbert et al. (2011). It is also in line with the majority of findings on regular 
life insurance demand (cf. Chapter 4) and affirms the notion that higher formal 
education fosters need awareness and enables an informed life insurance purchase 
decision (Hammond et al., 1967). In the subsequent analysis, these four variables will 
be included as controls. 
 
6.2.3 Regression results for Life-Cycle 
In the first model I, the hypothesis that later stages in a family’s life-cycle are negatively 
associated with the uptake of a micro endowment life insurance product is tested. 
Therefore, an interaction variable life-cycle is included in the model. This dichotomous 
variable takes the value 1 if a household’s head is older than 49 and has children older 
than 16 as described above. Including this variable in the regression changes the 
coefficient estimates for the control variables. The marginal effect of age increases to 
0.0134 and becomes significant at the 5 percent level. The direction regarding the 
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influence of the number of dependents variable turns positive but remains insignificant. 
The life-cycle interaction variable itself is negative (-0.3677) and highly significant at 
the 1 percent level. The model estimation uses robust standard errors. An analysis of 
multicollinearity yielded a mean VIF of 1.46 and thus collinearity of variables seems 
not to be an issue. In this model the Chi²-statistic and McFadden Pseudo R² are 0.0071 
and 0.0543 respectively. 
 
 
 
A direct comparison with previous findings in the literature is not possible as such a 
variable was – to the best of my knowledge – never tested before. The studies by 
Bendig and Arun (2011) and Giesbert et al. (2011) also discussed a life-cycle effect, 
although based on the influence of the age variable (cf. Chapter 4). A similarity might 
exist with the findings for an age-squared variable previously tested by the same 
studies. Both included age-squared and found a significant negative relationship with 
microinsurance demand. According to Bendig & Arun (2011) one possible explanation 
Table 12: Marginal effect probit regression for life-cycle effect 
Model 
Life-Cycle 
    I 
Age 
 
0.0134** 
(0.0059) 
Dependents 0.0024 
(0.0260) 
Education+ 0.1976** 
(Secondary or Higher Education) (0.0819) 
Location+ 0.1017 
    (0.0940) 
Life-Cycle+ -0.3677*** 
    (0.0956) 
Prob > Chi² 0.0071 
Pseudo R² 0.0543 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF) 1.46 
Observations 207 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0 
Note: Definitions for explanatory variables included in this table are: Age of respondent measured in years; Dependents’ 
number in household; Education of respondent is secondary or higher level; Location of respondent is in urban environment; 
Life-Cycle as interaction variable between respondent’s age over 49 and has children over 16. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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for this result might be that “older household heads […] are less educated and thus, less 
able to understand insurance products and markets than their younger counterparts.” (p. 
15) 
The result of the life-cycle model in this thesis suggests an alternative explanation. The 
coefficient estimate for number of dependents turns positive when including the life-
cycle interaction variable. This indicates that the number of children indeed could have 
a positive effect as reported in earlier studies (Giesbert, 2010; Bendig & Arun, 2011). 
Also the age control variable’s marginal effect becomes stronger and significant in 
specification I suggesting that other factors – perhaps a more solid financial situation 
and increased experience – outweigh the education factors proposed by Bendig and 
Arun (2011). The results could be explained if having children above 16 in a family 
represents a kind of insurance by itself since they can contribute to a household’s 
income in times of need. Yet, one caveat regarding this result needs to be mentioned: 
the MFI distributing this product is particularly concerned with the well-being of 
children and thus this result could be influenced by the MFIs pre-selection. The 
hypothesis (H1) that a household’s life-cycle is negatively related to micro life 
insurance uptake, however, is supported by the regression results in specification I.  
 
6.2.4 Regression results for Economic Capacity 
In the second estimation model, the hypothesis that the economic capacity of a 
household has a positive influence on microinsurance participations is tested. In contrast 
to the many studies on influence of wealth and income presented above (cf. Chapter 4), 
in this analysis not protection of living standard but liquidity and thus affordability of 
the insurance premium is highlighted to account for the microfinance context. The 
marginal effects at the mean estimated by the probit regression are positive as expected 
and significant for the employment status (p<0.05), asset endowment (p<0.10), 
consumption development (p<0.10), and payment of remittances (p<0.01). However, 
the expected positive effect of remittances received is not found to be significant. 
Further the effect of multi-earner households turns out negative as expected but is 
insignificant. This marginal effects at means estimation uses robust standard errors. An 
analysis of multicollinearity yielded a mean VIF of 1.20 and thus collinearity of 
variables seems not to be an issue. Yet, a high Pearson correlation could be found 
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between the variable for formal employment with education (0.3096) and asset 
endowment (0.2316) (cf. Appendix: Table 19). Due to the high correlation it is not 
surprising that the control variable education turns insignificant in the specification II. 
Regarding the models explanatory power, an improvement of the Chi²-statistic (0.0015) 
and the McFadden Pseudo R² (0.0986) is observed (cf. Table 13).  
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The economic capacity model II shows a positive and significant effect of formal 
employment. This suggests that calculable income streams are an important determinant 
regarding the demand for microinsurance. Taking into consideration that the long term 
of the microinsurance product – 5 years – was reported as the main reason for deciding 
Table 13: Marginal effect probit regression for economic capacity 
Model Economic Capacity 
    II 
Age 
 
0.0046 
(0.0048) 
Dependents -0.0157 
(0.0283) 
Education+ 0.1029 
(Secondary or Higher Education) (0.0980) 
Location+ 0.0655 
    (0.1023) 
Economic Capacity 
 
 
Employee+ 0.1636** 
(0.0783) 
 
Multi-Earner Household+ -0.0142 
(0.0859) 
 
Asset Endowment 0.3793* 
(0.2005) 
 
Consumption Development 0.0052* 
(0.0027) 
 
Remittance – received+ 0.0190 
 (0.1225) 
 
Remittance – paid+ 0.2884*** 
    (0.1046) 
Prob > Chi² 0.0015 
Pseudo R² 0.0986 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF) 1.20 
Observations 207 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0.  
 
Note: Definitions for explanatory variables included in the analysis are: Age of respondent measured in years; Dependents’ 
number in household; Education of respondent is secondary or higher level; Location of respondent is in urban environment; 
Employee indicates formal employment of respondent or spouse; Multi-Earner Household are households with more than one 
breadwinner; Asset Endowment is an index value for number of common assets owned by household; Consumption 
Development defined as difference in IDR between households daily consumption value today and one year before; 
Remittance - received indicates household receives regular payments from relatives; Remittance – paid indicates household 
pays regular payments to relatives. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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against participation, it seems as if the worry on how to finance the insurance for such a 
long term with uncertain income is a main reason for abstaining from the insurance. The 
payment of remittances by the household is also of significant positive influence which 
suggests that a household who is able to help providing for others has the ability to pay 
for the insurance premium and take a financial precaution for the own family. The 
positive effect of asset endowment is in line with the vast majority of previous research 
on regular and micro life insurance (cf. Table 1 & Table 2). A high asset endowment is 
not only a sign of higher income and economic capacity but it could also hint at the fact 
that the most important assets are already part of the household, i.e. the household is not 
constrained by saving for necessary additional assets. The positive relationship with 
consumption development supports the notion that additional income represents a 
windfall and discretionary consumption alternatives are still competing for the most 
efficient use of the increment.  
Microinsurance is targeting poor households in particular and great hopes regarding 
poverty alleviation are associated with this market (cf. Chapter 2). Nevertheless, also 
this study supports earlier findings that it is particularly households with already 
relatively high asset endowments, formal employment, and the ability to pay 
remittances who consume this product (Bendig & Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011). 
Hence, it is rather the better off, more liquid households who become microinsurance 
customers. Altogether, the hypothesis (H2) that economic capacity of a household is 
positively related to micro life insurance uptake is supported by the results of the 
analysis.  
 
6.2.5 Regression results for Product Understanding 
The specification III examines the hypothesis that a better understanding for the offered 
insurance product increases the likelihood of participating in the microinsurance 
scheme. A lack of understanding for the insurance concept is often mentioned as a 
principal reason for low product adoption in the microfinance market (McCord, 2001; 
Chankova et al., 2008; Ito & Kono, 2010; Bendig & Arun, 2011). Therefore, in this 
analysis a thorough evaluation of the target group’s financial literacy and product 
understanding is conducted.  
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The estimation results for the marginal effects of the binary probit regression analysis 
show a strong positive effect of product comprehension on microinsurance 
participation. A positive marginal effect at the mean is found for financial literacy and 
significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of 0.4073 implies that an increase of 
financial literacy by one unit for an average respondent increases – ceteris paribus – the 
probability to participate in the microinsurance by 40.7 percent. Also the marginal effect 
at the mean for product knowledge is quiet strong (0.3005), though, not significant 
(Robust SE 0.2000). An analysis of multicollinearity resulted in a mean VIF of 1.22 and 
thus collinearity of variables seems not to be distorting the results. A two-sided t-Test 
for the individual variables yielded a clear level of significance of difference for the 
group of microinsurance participants and non-participants for both variables (cf. Table 
11).  
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The sentiment in the literature that an understanding for the concept of insurance and 
specific product features is beneficial for microinsurance uptake is supported. As 
expected the relationship between financial literacy and product knowledge is quite 
strong with a Pearson correlation of 0.1745 (cf. Appendix). The analysis shows that an 
understanding for the product increases the demand for the abstract product ‘insurance’ 
and probably also increases faith in the concept. In conclusion, the hypothesis (H3) that 
product understanding is positively related to micro life insurance uptake is supported 
by the empirical findings presented here. 
 
Table 14: Marginal effect probit regression for product understanding 
Model Product Understanding 
    III 
Age 
 
0.0021 
(0.0050) 
Dependents 0.0008 
(0.0295) 
Education
+
 0.1148 
(Secondary or Higher Education) (0.0913) 
Location
+
 0.0774 
    (0.0972) 
Product Understanding 
 
 
Financial Literacy 0.4073** 
(0.1919) 
 
Product Knowledge 0.3005 
    (0.2000) 
Prob > Chi² 0.0435 
Pseudo R² 0.0465 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF) 1.22 
Observations 201 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0 
 
Note: Definitions for explanatory variables included in the analysis are: Age of respondent measured in years; Dependents’ 
number in household; Education of respondent is secondary or higher level; Location of respondent is in urban environment; 
Financial Literacy is an index value based on the respondent's ability to answer a set of financial literacy assessing questions; 
Product Knowledge is an index value based on the respondent's ability to answer a set of questions related to the previously 
offered product correctly. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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6.2.6 Regression results for Trust 
Insurance participation requires trust in the provider. Participants are paying a regular 
premium and receive in turn the promise of a payment in the future if certain conditions 
are met. Particularly in the microinsurance context trust can work as a mitigating factor 
for a lack of understanding and risk aversion towards the unfamiliar concept. Trust, 
however, is an abstract concept and cannot be measured easily. Therefore, a set of 
variables is investigated and included in the analysis to examine if trust is influential.  
The binary probit regression model IV yields positive marginal effects at the mean for 
all trust related variables included in the model. Significant at the 5 percent level, 
however, are only the variables for experience (0.9724) and brand recognition (0.1742) 
(cf. Table 14). In the case of experience, the strong effect supports the intuition of 
previous work (e.g. Churchill, 2000; Cai et al., 2010; Bendig & Arun, 2011). A 
breakdown of the aggregated variable experience reveals that the correlation between 
being a microinsurance participant and the attitude towards the insurer (0.2472) and the 
experience with the socializer (0.1875) is somewhat stronger than the correlation with 
the MFI experience (0.1133) (cf. Appendix). The influence of branding, though, is less 
meaningful since it could not be controlled for the direction of causality of brand 
recognition observations. While, on the one hand, higher brand recognition might be a 
sign for increased familiarity with the insurer and thus trust, on the other hand, it could 
also be a result of the participation in the micro life insurance.  
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A breakdown of the trust index reveals that the level of significance of difference is 
significant for the observations regarding the trust towards relatives (1 percent level) 
and the insurer (5 percent level) (cf. Table 8). This result supports the conjecture that 
trust towards the insurer is of particular importance. Further, it might indicate that 
Table 15: Marginal effect probit regression for trust 
Model Trust 
    IV  
Age 
 
0.0025 
(0.0053) 
Dependents -0.0022 
(0.0295) 
Education 0.1411 
(Secondary or Higher Education) (0.0940) 
Location 0.1584 
    (0.1063) 
Trust 
 
 
Trust Degree 0.2492 
(0.2838) 
 
Client Experience 0.9724** 
(0.3831) 
 
ROSCA participation 0.0361 
(0.0360) 
 
MFI Tenure 0.0027 
(0.0033) 
 
Brand Recognition 0.1742** 
(0.0814) 
Prob > Chi² 0.0075 
Pseudo R² 0.0931 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF) 1.23 
Observations 189 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0 
 
Note: Definitions for explanatory variables included in the analysis are: Age of respondent measured in years; Dependents’ 
number in household; Education of respondent is secondary or higher level; Location of respondent is in urban environment; 
Trust Degree is an index value based on the respondent's own trust assessment in general and towards specific groups of 
persons on a 7-point Likert scale; Client Experience  is an index value based on the respondent's own experience and attitude 
assessment towards the socializer, the MFI, and the Insurer on a 7-point Likert scale; ROSCA Participation states number of 
informal financial groups the respondent is participating in; MFI Tenure is the number of months the respondents is already 
cooperating with the MFI which offers the microinsurance plan; Brand Recognition for respondents’ ability to recognize brand 
name of insurance partner. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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respondents who are particularly close with their family are more likely to purchase a 
product which protects their financial interests. The low marginal effects and 
insignificant value for ROSCA membership could be explained by the close proximity 
of the participants, usually either among neighbors or relatives. Peer monitoring is 
intensive and, hence, perhaps does not require a high trust level on the participant’s 
side. Yet, the positive marginal effect of all considered influence factors and the 
statistically significant effect of experience and brand recognition support the initial 
hypothesis that trust level is positively related to micro life insurance consumption.  
 
6.2.7 Probit Regression results for Full Model 
The full model V including the control variables and the variables on life-cycle, product 
understanding, economic capacity, and trust is estimated (cf. Table 15). A statistically 
significant model fit at the 1 percent level (Prob > Chi²) and approximation of the 
model’s coefficient of determination of 0.1890 (McFadden’s Pseudo R²), suggest that 
the factors investigated in this thesis indeed have explanatory power regarding the 
uptake of voluntary micro life insurance. The fact that direction of effect of the 
explanatory variables remains the same in the integrated model implies that no 
considerable rivalry between the formulated hypotheses exists. Multicollinearity for the 
full model is acceptable low with a VIF of 1.35.  
The findings indicate a particular important influence on micro life insurance uptake of 
the factors life-cycle, asset endowment, formal employment, remittance payments, 
consumption development, respondent’s experience with the involved parties, and brand 
recognition.  
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Table 16: Marginal effect probit regression for full model 
Model Univariate Full Model 
Age 
 
0.0005 0.0168** 
  
(0.0039) (0.0070) 
Dependents 0.0150 -0.0065 
  
(0.0218) (0.0308) 
Education+ 0.1790** 0.0332 
(Secondary or Higher Education) (0.0781) (0.1172) 
Location+ 0.1119 0.1360 
    (0.0918) (0.1137) 
Life-Cycle+ -0.2056** -0.4437*** 
    (0.0919) (0.0969) 
 
Employee+ 0.2382*** 0.1696** 
  
(0.0682) (0.0859) 
 
Multi-Earner Household+ -0.0333 -0.0331 
  
(0.0775) (0.0967) 
 
Asset Endowment 0.5425*** 0.4259* 
  
(0.1873) (0.2528) 
 
Consumption Development 0.0063** 0.0051* 
  
(0.0025) (0.0029) 
 
Remittance – Received+ 0.0489 0.0372 
  
(0.1033) (0.1233) 
 
Remittance – Paid+ 0.2470** 0.2091* 
   (0.1029) (0.1177) 
 
Financial Literacy 0.5240*** 0.3338 
  
(0.1818) (0.2203) 
 
Product Knowledge 0.4077** 0.0873 
   (0.1929) (0.2247) 
 
Trust Degree 0.3263 0.1579 
  
(0.2423) (0.3151) 
 
Client Experience 1.2314*** 0.9421** 
  
(0.3632) (0.4140) 
 
ROSCA participation 0.0613* -0.0143 
  
(0.0339) (0.0372) 
 
MFI Tenure 0.0025 0.0029 
  
(0.0031) (0.0034) 
 
Brand Recognition+ 0.2290*** 0.1975** 
  
(0.0723) (0.0871) 
Prob > Chi²   0.0001 
Pseudo R² 
 
0.1890 
Multicollinearity (Mean VIF)  1.35 
Observations   188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0   
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this thesis, socio-economic determinants of micro life insurance demand were 
analyzed in light of the microfinance context and based on previous research on life 
insurance as well as microinsurance demand. The expectations and hopes towards 
microinsurance with respect to poverty alleviation, new market opportunities, and 
economic growth were established to begin with. In combination with an abstract of the 
historical development of insurance and particularly the important role of microfinance 
institutions for the development of the middle-class in 19th century Europe, the potential 
of microinsurance in today’s emerging economies is underscored. Microinsurance is 
found an important tool to enable bottom-of-the-pyramid communities to benefit from 
ex ante risk management strategies which contribute to breaking out of the poverty 
circle. It empowers entrepreneurs to make more efficient use of their productive assets 
or helps family’s to safeguard the well-being and education of their dependents. 
Furthermore, due to its sheer size the microinsurance market worldwide holds huge 
revenue potential for international insurance providers despite the low, individual 
premium. As an aggregate the contributions of microinsurance customer can provide an 
important capital source for national and economic development in emerging economies 
once they are included in the formal economy. Yet, however, in contrast to the 
successful microfinance movement in Europe, the current microfinance revolution is 
less participative and without sound regulation the fears of development organizations 
and donors that private capital will seek to exploit the bottom-of-the-pyramid market 
instead of developing it might comes true. It was also expounded in this thesis, for what 
reasons volume is a crucial consideration in insurance provision next to actuarial 
modeling and appropriate loading factors. Since volume seems to be the key for 
successfully developing the microinsurance market, the question what determines the 
demand for offered products is of crucial importance.  
Further, previous research on demand determinants of life insurance in general and 
microinsurance in particular was reviewed in this thesis and provided the basis for the 
empirical analysis. The review showed that in accordance with the predictions of 
theoretical models a number of variables was commonly found influential. Moreover, 
the analysis revealed that emerging markets in particular are responsive to the growth of 
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the insurance sector and national economies can benefit from a developed insurance 
industry.  
 
Based on the previous research introduced in the literature review and the expectations 
expressed towards microinsurance, four hypotheses were formulated. Two of them 
concerned the properties of the decision-maker’s household, that is life-cycle stage and 
economic capacity, and the other two were directed at characteristics of the insurance 
purchaser individually, namely product understanding and trust levels. The data 
availability for microinsurance research is still scarce and thus for the purpose of testing 
the formulated hypothesis, an own data collection was conducted. For this, 208 
microfinance clients in urban Indonesia were surveyed with personally administered, 
comprehensive questionnaires. The resulting data set was prepared for the analysis and 
described. A marginal effects probit regression analysis revealed significant influence, 
either in full or in part, for all four demand determinants investigated in this research. 
For microinsurance, the demand determinants were generally in agreement with the 
findings for life insurance demand in developed countries. Yet, a contradicting result for 
the influence of risk aversion was reported (Giné et al., 2008; Giesbert et al., 2011). An 
explanation for this finding could be the unfamiliarity of the BOP market with the 
concept of insurance which presents a risk for them itself. 
 
Further, it could be shown that the life-cycle stage of households is significantly related 
to micro life insurance consumption. In contrast to earlier studies which based their 
analysis on the effects of age and suggested a negative life-cycle effect due to 
decreasing comprehension of the insurance concept among older persons (Bendig & 
Arun, 2011), the results in this thesis points at the importance of mature children which 
can substitute for risk protection through their ability to earn additional income. 
However, this indicative result needs to be corroborated by future research. Especially, 
an ex post investigation could provide the required data to undermine this result.  
Regarding economic capacity as a demand determining factor, this research focused on 
the relative capability of households to afford the insurance premium rather than 
considering the economic situation of a household as determinant of the proper amount 
of life insurance. Earning regular income as an employee, an already higher endowment 
with desired basic assets, a current increase of consumption capacity, and regular 
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transfer payments to relatives were found to be positively related to micro life insurance 
uptake. These results suggest that a household whose liquidity situation is relatively 
stable and allows for discretionary allocation is more likely to add life insurance to its 
financial portfolio. Moreover, it was revealed that in line with previous findings also 
microinsurance in Indonesia is not yet able to reach out to the very poor community 
members. 
As suggested by the reviewed literature a positive relation between product 
understanding, expressed as higher financial literacy and better product knowledge, to 
micro life insurance demand was found. Also the clients experience with the involved 
parties and the recognition of the insurer’s brand seem to be important demand 
determinants. Already Webb et al. (2009) suggested that insurers’ reputation is an 
important selection criterion for clients. A derivation from this result for the 
microinsurance practice could be that providers need to take a high involvement 
distribution approach in order to stimulate the demand volumes needed to achieve 
commercial viability for microinsurance. In addition, the analysis revealed that the 
understanding of microinsurance customers in Indonesia for the financial product is 
rather low which makes them vulnerable for exploitation. In order to create a 
sustainable market, insurers need to carefully cultivate their reputation among the BoP 
community. 
 
The findings in this thesis might offer some additional insight for policy- and decision-
makers in a development context. For NGOs and other institutions with a preponderant 
poverty alleviation interest, it is relevant that support on education and, specifically, 
financial literacy potentially accelerates the acceptance of microinsurance services. 
Further, an independent advisor role to help household heads on how to make best use 
of additional financial resources could help the dispersion of insurance in the low 
income households. Moreover, it can protect the economically advancing families 
against exploitation by dubious businesses. Also for commercial market participants this 
analysis can hold some interesting findings. Firstly, the insight on economic and 
demographic demand determinants, such as life-cycle effects, occupations, or asset 
endowments, can facilitate a more focused targeting. Successful targeting is crucial to 
keep transaction costs down and make micro life insurance commercially viable. 
Secondly, the importance of clients experience and significant correlation with brand 
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recognition is an opportunity and a warning at the same time. While commercial 
businesses can use micro insurance to gain an early foothold in a market segment of 
increasing attraction, they need to offer high quality services to build a good reputation 
and also be wary to maintain this fragile good. Last but not least, government officials 
and policy-makers need to take the micro insurance movement serious and see the 
potential for economic development which can be recognized looking at the aggregated 
numbers. In addition, enabling a private market solution for basic health and social 
services can take some pressure off public budgets and tension from a quickly 
developing society, characterized by urbanization, disintegration of traditional family 
structures and widening gaps between rich and poor classes. However, therefore a sound 
legal framework needs to be established which protects customers and creates sufficient 
trust to commit to long-term financial products; but also encourages commercial 
businesses to invest in the development of a market whose profitability depends on 
volume.  
 
A recent study from Ghana on general willingness-to-pay, ex ante, for a microinsurance 
product supports the results from the present analysis discussed above. Akotey et al. 
(2011) find that the possibility of flexible premium payments is appreciated as well as 
positive demand effects of an increase in income, sound insurance knowledge, and 
positive perception of the insurer. However, the findings presented here are subject to 
certain limitations and thus further research is needed to validate them. Firstly, the 
sample size which could be utilized in this analysis is rather small and the investigation 
if these results hold for a larger sample size is considered necessary. Secondly, the 
insurance purchasers interviewed in this research are the first ones from their peer group 
to participate and, hence, represent a group of early-adopters. If the characteristics 
which are influential for the micro life insurance demand of the whole populace are the 
same, needs to be assessed at a later point in time after market introduction. Moreover, 
in this context not only an analysis of the factors which influence microinsurance uptake 
but also determinants’ of persistency is of importance. Thirdly, this investigation was 
conducted for a micro life insurance product marketed in urban Indonesia, more 
specifically, the greater Jakarta area. Additional testing of the hypothesis examined in 
this work in alternative surroundings is desirable. Based on the results of this and 
previous research an investigation of the interaction between the effect of risk aversion, 
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trust and product understanding could provide interesting insights in how far the three 
are interrelated and can substitute for another. Additional research can help to better 
explore and understand the field of microinsurance and, thereby, contribute to tap its 
full potential. 
85 
 
8 References 
Adams, J., & Raymond, F. (2008). Did Yunus Deserve the Nobel Peace Prize: 
Microfinance or Microfarce?. Journal of Economic Issues, 42(2), 435-443. 
Akula, V. (2008). Business Basics at the Base of the Pyramid. Harvard Business 
Review, 86(6), 53-57. 
Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J. (2012). Targeting the 
Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. American Economic Review, 
102(4), 1206-1240. 
Ando, A., & Modigliani, F. (1963). The ‘Life-Cycle’ Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate 
Implications and Test. American Economic Review, 53, 55-84. 
Annan, K. (n.d.). un.org. Retrieved November 22, 2011, from Secretary General, 
SG/SM/10151: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm10151.doc.htm 
Augsburg, B. (2010). Profit Empowerment: The Microfinance Institution’s Mission 
Drift. Perspectives on Global Development & Technology, 9(3/4), 327-355. 
Auxier, A. L. (1976). A Test of the Usefulness of Policy Information in Ranking Life 
Insurance Alternatives. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 43, 87-98. 
Babbel, D. F. (1985). The Price Elasticty of Demand for Whole Life Insurance. The 
Journal of Finance, 40(1), 225-239. 
Backhaus, K., Erichson, B., Plinke, W., & Weiber, R. (2006). Multivariate 
Analysemethode: Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung. Berlin: Springer. 
Bandura, A. (1997). Self-Efficacy, the Exercise of Control. New York: W. H. Freeman 
& Co. 
Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2011). Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way 
to Fight Global Poverty. New York: Perseus. 
Basaza, R., Criel, B., & Van der Stuyft, P. (2008). Community health insurance in 
Uganda: Why does enrolment remain low? A view from beneath. Health Policy, 87, 
172-184. 
Beck, T., & Webb, I. (2003). Economic, Demographic, and Institutional Determinants 
of Life Insurance Consumption. The World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 51-88. 
86 
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and the sources of growth. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 58, 261-300. 
Belson, W. A. (1986). Respondent understanding of questions in the survey interview. 
Survey Research Centre: London School of Economics (LSE). 
Bendig, M., & Arun, T. (2011). Enrolment in Micro Life and Health Inusrance: 
Evidences from Sri Lanka. Bonn: IZA DP No. 5427. 
Bendig, M., Giesbert, L., & Steiner, S. (2010). Savings, Credit and Insurance: 
Household Demand for Formal Financial Services in Rural Ghana. GIGA Working 
Paper No 94 , Hamburg. 
Berekson, L. L. (1972). Birth Order, Anxiety,Affiliation and the Purchase of Life 
Insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 39(1), 93-108. 
Bhat, R., & Jain, N. (2006). Factoring Affecting the Demand for Health Insurance in a 
Micro Insurance Scheme. IMF Working Paper3589. Washington D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
Barslund, M. C., & Tarp, F. (2008). Formal and informal rural credit in four provinces 
of Vietnam. Journal of Development Studies, 44(4), 485-503. 
Brooks, C. (2008). Introductory econometrics for finance. Cambridge: University Press. 
Brown, W., & Churchill, C. F. (2000). Insurance Provision in Low-Income 
Communities. Bethesda: DAI. 
Browne, J. R., & Finkelstein, A. (2007). Why is the Market for Long-Term Care 
Insurance so Small? Journal of Public Economics, 91(10), 1967-1991. 
Browne, M. J., & Kim, K. (1993). An International Analysis of Life Insurance Demand. 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 60(4), 616-634. 
Burnett, J. R., & Palmer, A. (1984). Examining Life Insurance Ownership Through 
Demographic and Psychographic Characteristics. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 51(3), 
453-467. 
Cai, H., Chen, Y., Fang, H., & Zhou, L.-A. (2010). Microinsurance, Trust and 
Economic Development: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Field Experiment. 
mimeo, 1-34. 
Campbell, R. A. (1980). The Demand for Life Insurance: An Application of the 
Economics of Uncertainty. The Journal of Finance, 35, 1155-1172. 
87 
CGAP. (n.d.). Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. Retrieved March 07, 2012, from 
What is Microfinance?: http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.11.947/. 
Chambers, E. A., & Cox, D. R. (1967). Discrimination between alternative binary 
response models. Biometrika, 54, 573-578. 
Chandhok, G. A. (2009). Insurance - A Tool to Eradicate and a Vehicle to Economic 
Development. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 24, 71-76. 
Churchill, C. (2007). Insuring the Low-Income Market: Challenges and Solutions for 
Commercial Insurers. The Geneva Papers, 32, 401-412. 
Churchill, C. (2002). Trying to Understand the Demand for Microinsurance. Journal of 
International Development, 14, 381-387. 
Churchill, C. (2006). What is insurance for the poor? In C. Churchill, Protecting the 
poor - A microinsurance compendium (pp. 12-22). Geneva: International Labour Office. 
CIA. (2011). The World Factbook. www: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-
factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html?countryName=Argentina&countryCode=ar&region
Code=soa&rank=34#ar. 
Clark, G. W. (1999). Betting on Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 
16095-1775. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Clarke, D., & Kalani, G. (2011). Microinsurance Decisions: Evidence from Ethiopia. 
Mimeo, University of Oxford, 1-43. 
Cohen, M., & Sebstad, J. (2005). Reducing Vulnerability: The Demand for 
Microinsurance. Journal of International Development, 17, 397-474. 
Cole, S., Sampson, t., & Zia, B. (2011). Prices or Knowledge? What Drives the Demand 
for Financial Services in Emerging Markets? The Journal of Finance , Forthcoming. 
Coudouel, A., Hentschel, J. S., & Wodon, Q. T. (2002). Poverty Measurement and 
Analysis. In J. Klugman, A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies (p. Chapter 1). 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Crosby, L. A., & Stephens, N. (1987). Effects of Relationship Marketing on 
Satisfaction, Retention, and Prices in the Life Insurance Industry. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 24(4), 404-411. 
Daley-Harris, S. (2009). State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report. 
Microcredit summit campaign , Washington D.C. 
88 
De Allegri, M., Kouyate, B., Becher, H., Gbangou, A., Pokhrel, S., Sanon, M., et al. 
(2006). Understanding enrolment in community health insurance in sub-Saharan Africa: 
a population-based case–control study in rural Burkina Faso. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, 84(11), 852-858. 
Dercon, S. (2006). Vulnerability: a Micro Perspective. In F. bourguignon, B. Pleskovic, 
& J. van der Gaag, Securing Development in an Unstable World (p. Chapter 6). 
Washington: The World Bank. 
Dercon, S., & Kirchberger, M. (2008). Literature Review on Microinsurance. Oxford: 
Oxford University. 
Diamond, P. (1992). Organizing the Health Insurance Market. Econometrica ,60(6), 
1233-1254. 
Doherty, N. A., & Schlesinger, H. (1990). Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration 
of Contract Nonperformance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 243-253. 
Duker, J. M. (1969). Expenditures for Life Insurance Among Working-Wife Families. 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 36(5), 525-533. 
Ekman, B. (2004). Community Based Health Insurance in Developing Countries: a 
systematic review of the evidence. Health Policy and Planning, 19(5), 249-270. 
Fessler, D. M. (2002). Windfall and Socially Distributed Willpower: The 
Psychocultural Dynamics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in a Bengkulu 
Village. Ethos, 30(1/2), 25-48. 
Fischer, S. (1973). A Life Cycle Model of Life Insurance Purchases. International 
Economic Review, 14(1), 132-152. 
Fisher, I. (1930). The Theory of Interest. New York: Macmillan. 
Giesbert, L. (2010). Uptake of Micro-Life Insurance in Rural Ghana. Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre 2010 Conference - Ten Years of ‘War against Poverty’: What have we 
learned since 2000 and what should we do 2010-2020?, University of Manchester, 8-10 
September 2010. 
 
Giesbert, L., Steiner, S., & Bendig, M. (2011). Participation in Micro Life Insurance 
and the Use of Other Financial Services in Ghana. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 
78, 7-35. 
Giné, X., & Yang, D. (2009). Insurance, Credit, and Technology Adoption: Field 
Experimental Evidencefrom Malawi. Journal of Development Economics, 89(1), 1-11. 
89 
Gine, X., Townsend, R., & Vickery, J. (2007). Patterns of Rainfall Insurance 
Participation in Rural India. Washington D.C.: Policy Research Working Paper 4408, 
World Bank. 
Gonzalez, A. (2010). Is microfinance growing too fast? Retrieved April 08, 2012 from 
Social Science Research Network: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1644948. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2008). Trusting the Stock Market. The Journal 
of Finance, 63(6), 2557-2600. 
Haiss, P. R., & Sümegi, K. (2008). The Relationship of Insurance and Economic 
Growth - A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Journal of Applied Economics and 
Economic Policy, 35(4), 405-431. 
Hammond, J. D., Houston, D. B., & Melander, E. R. (1967). Determinants of 
Household Life Insurance Premium Expenditures: An Empirical Investigation. Journal 
of Risk and Insurance, 34(3), 397-408. 
Han, L., Li, D., Moshirian, F., & Tian, Y. (2010). Insurance Development and 
Economic Growth. The Geneva Papers, 35(2), 183-199. 
Hintz, M. (2010). Micro-Impact: Deconstructing the complex impact process of a 
simple microinsurance product in Indonesia, Saarbrücken: SVH. 
Hofmann, A. (2009). Imperfect Insurance Markets - An Economic Analysis of 
Externalities and Consumer Diversity. Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft. 
Holton, R. (1981). Public Regulation of Consumer Information: The Life Insurance 
Industry Case. In F. Balderston, J. Carman, & F. Nicosia, Regulation of Marketing and 
the Public Interest: A Tribute to Ewald T. Grether on Occasion of His Eightieth 
Birthday (pp. 143-154). New York: Pergamon Press. 
Hossain, F. (2002, September 01). Foreign Policy. Retrieved March 07, 2012, from 
Small Loans, Big Claims: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/09/01/small_loans_big_claims. 
Hossain, F., & Rahman, Z. (2001). Microfinance and Poverty: Contemporary 
Perspectives. Helsinki: Service Center for Development Cooperation. 
Hulme, D. (2007). Integrating Quantitative And Qualitative Research For Country 
Case Studies Of Development. Retrieved on April 28, 2012 from ESRC Global Poverty 
Research Group: http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-063.pdf. 
Ito, S., & Kono, H. (2010). Why is the Take-Up for Microinsurance so Low? Evidence 
from a Health Insurence Scheme in India. Developing Economies, 48(1), 74-101.  
90 
Jabbar, M. A., Ehui, S. K., & von Kaufmann, R. (2002). Supply and Demand for 
Livestock Credit in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons for Designing New Credit Schemes. 
World Development, 30(6), 1029-1042. 
Jalan, J., & Ravallion, M. (1999). Are the Poor Less Well Insured? Evidence on 
Vulnerability to Income Risk in Rural China. Journal of Development Economics, 
58(1), 61-82. 
Karlan, D., & Murdoch, J. (2009). Access to Finance. In D. Rodrik, & M. Rosenzweig, 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 5, Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland, 
4307-84. 
Karlan, D., & Zinman, J. (2008). Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: 
Implications for Microfinance. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 1040-1068. 
Karlan, D., Mobius, M., Rosenblat, T., & Szeidl, A. (2009). Trust and Social Collateral. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), 1307-1361. 
Karlan, D., Murdoch, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2010). Take-up: Why Microfinance Take-
up Rates Are Low & Why It Matters. Retrieved April 08, 2012, from Financial Access 
Initiative: 
http://financialaccess.org/sites/default/files/RFN11_Why_microfinance_takeup_rates_ar
e_low%286-17-10%29.pdf. 
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993). Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and 
Evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 513-542. 
Kinnear, T. C., & Taylor, J. R. (1991). Marketing Research. New York, 3rd edition: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Kiva. (2012, 04 08). Kiva.org. Retrieved April 08, 2012, from Kiva: 
http://www.kiva.org/partners/189. 
Lafourcade A., I. J. (2005). Overview of the Outreach and Financial Performance of 
Microfinance Institutions in Africa. Retrieved April 08, 2012 from Microfinance 
Information eXchange:  
http://www.griequity.com/resources/industryandissues/financeandmicrofinance/Africa_
Data_Study.pdf. 
Lewis, F. D. (1989). Dependents and the Demand for Life Insurance. The American 
Economic Review, 79(3), 452-467. 
Li, D., Moshirian, F., Nguyen, P., & Wee, T. (2007). The Demand for Life Insurance in 
OECD Countries. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74(3), 637-652. 
91 
Lim, C. C., & Haberman, S. (2004). Macroeconomic Variables and the Demand for Life 
Insurance in Malaysia. mimeo , 1-21. 
Lloyds. (2010). Insurance in developing countries: Exploring opportunities in 
microinsurance. London: MicroInuranceCentre. 
Magnoni, B., & Powers, J. (2009). Will the bottom of the pyramid hit bottom? The 
effects of global credit crisis on the microfinance sector. Report Prepared for the United 
States Agency for International Development. 
Maleika, M., & Kuriakose, A. T. (2008). Microinsurance: Extending Pro-Poor Risk 
Management through the Social Fund Platform. Washington: The World Bank.  
Mankiw, N. G. (2008). Principles of Economics. Florence: Cengage Learning Emea. 
Mantis, G., & Farmer, R. (1968). Demand for Life Insurance. Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 35(2), 247-256. 
Marshall, A. (1920). Principles of Economics. New York: Macmillan. 
Mawa, B. (2008). Impact of Microfinance: Towards Achieving Poverty Alleviation? 
Pakistan Journal of Social Science, 5(9), 876-882. 
McCord, M. J. (2008). Visions of the Future of Microinsurance, and Thoughts on 
Getting There. Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development. 
McCord, M., Ramm, G., & McGuiness, E. (2006). Microinsurance demand and market 
prospects: Indonesia. Eschborn: UNDP-GTZ-Allianz. 
Miller, A. S., & Mitamura, T. (2003). Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy? Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 66(1), 62-70. 
Morduch, J. (1999). The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4), 
1569-1614. 
Morris, S., Neidecker-Gonzales, O., Carletto, C., Munguia, M., & Medina, J. M. (2002). 
Hurricane Mitch and the Livelihoods of the Rural Poor in Honduras. World 
Development, 30(1), 49-60. 
Morsink, K., & Geurts, P. (2011). Informal trust building factors and the demand for 
microinsurance. 7th Annual International Microinsurance Conference (pp. 1-27). Rio 
de Janeiro: Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), University of Twente, The 
Netherlands. 
92 
Mucadoglu, G., & Taskin, F. (1996). Differences in Household Saving Behaviour: 
Evidence from Industrial and Developing Countries. The Developing Economies, 34(2), 
138-153. 
Murdoch, J. (2002). Micro-insurance: the next revolution? In A. Banerjee, R. Benabou, 
& D. Mookherjee, What Have We Learned About Poverty? (p. Forthcoming). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nelli, H. O. (1972). The Earliest Insurance Contract - A New Discovery. Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, 39(2), 215-220. 
Neumann, S. (1969). Inflation and Saving Through Life Insurance. Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 36(5), 567-582. 
Otero, M., & Rhyne, E. (1994). The New World of Microenterprise Finance: Building 
Healthy Financial Institutions for the Poor. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Outreville, J. F. (1996). Life Insurance Markets in Developing Countries. The Journal 
of Risk and Insurance, 63(2), 263-278. 
Patt, A., Peterson, N., Carter, M., Velez, M., Hess, U., & Suarez, P. (2009). Making 
Index Insurance Attractive to Farmers. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global 
Change, 14(8), 737-753. 
Pinquet, J., Guillet, M., & Ayuso, M. (2009). Commitment and Lapse Behavior in Long-
Term Insurance: A Case Study. Palaiseau Cedex: École Polytechnique. 
Pissarides, C. A. (1980). The Wealth-Age Relation with Life Insurance. Economica, 
47(188), 451-457. 
Prahalad, C. K. (2005). The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid - Eradicating Poverty 
Through Profit. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing. 
Radermacher, R., Ashok, S., Zabel, K., & Dror, I. (2009). What do we know about the 
impact of microinsurance? New Dehli, India: Micro Insurance Academy. 
Redzuan, H., Rahman, Z. A., & Aidid, S. S. (2009). Economic Determinants of Family 
Takaful Consumption: Evidence from Malaysia. International Review of Business 
Research Papers, 3(5), 193-211. 
Rejda, G. E. (2010). Principles of Risk Management and Insurance, 11th Edition. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (2003). Qualitative Research Practices - A Guide for Social 
Sciene Students and Researchers. London: SAGE Publications. 
93 
Robinson, M. S. (2002). The Microfinance Revolution - Volume 2: Lessons from 
Indonesia. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Robinson, M. S. (2001). The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the 
Poor. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Schneider, P., & Diop, F. (2001). Synopsis of Results on the Impact of Community-
Based Health Insurance on Financial Accessibility to Health Care in Rwanda. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Seibel, H. D. (2010). Does History Matter? The Old and The New World of 
Microfinance in Europe and Asia. Paper presented at From Moneylenders to 
Microfinance: Southeast Asia’s Credit Revolution in Institutional, Economic, and 
Cultural Perspective. Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 
October 7-8.  
Showers, V. E., & Shotick, J. A. (1994). The Effects of Household Characteristics on 
Demand for Life Insurance: A Tobit Analysis. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 61, 492-
502. 
Siegel, P. B., Alwang, J., & Canagarajah, S. (2001). Viewing Microinsurance as a 
Social Risk Management Instrument. Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0116. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Skipper, H. (1997). Foreign insurers in emerging markets: Issues and concerns. 
Retrieved Apri 08, 2012 from Center for Risk Management and Insurance. 
http://rmictr.gsu.edu/Papers/FOREIGN.pdf. 
Stefani G. (1958). Insurance in Venice from the Origins to the End of the Serenissima. 
Documents published for the 125th Anniversary of the Company (1831–1956). Trieste: 
Assicurazioni Generali di Trieste e Venezia. 
Swain, R. B. (2002). Credit Rationing in Rural India. Journal of Economic 
Development, 27(2), 1-20. 
SwissRe. (2010). World Insurance in 2009. Zürich: Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. 
The Economist. (2009). Global microscope on the microfinance business environment. 
Retrieved February 22, 2012, from 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2189221. 
The Geneva Association. (2011). Global Insurance Industry Fact-Sheet. Geneva: The 
Geneva Association. 
The Nielsen Company. (2010). Consumer Insight Report. New York: The Nielsen 
Company. 
94 
Townsend, R. (1994). Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica, 62(3), 539-
592. 
Trennery, C. F. (1926). The Origin and Early Histroy of Insurance. London: P. S. King 
& Son. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (1964). 
Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,. Final Act 
and Report (p. Volume 1). Geneva: United Nations. 
Valadez, R., & Buskirk, B. (2011). From Microcredit to Microfinance: a business 
perspective. The Journal of Finance and Accountancy, 6, 1-17. 
Vance, W. R. (1908). The Early History of Insurance Law. Columbia Law Review, 8(1), 
1-17. 
Vaté, M., & Dror, D. M. (2002). To Insure or not to Insure? Reflections on the Limits of 
Insurability. In D. M. Dror, & P. A. S., Social Reinsurance: A New Approach to 
Sustainable Community Health Financing (pp. 124-152). Washington D.C.: World 
Bank. 
Webb, D., Kristiani, N., & Olaru, D. (2009). Investigating the Key Criteria for Micro 
Loan Provider Selection: The Case of the Poor in Kedungjati, Indonesia. mimeo , 1-9. 
Webb, J. (2000). Questionnaires and their Design. The Marketing Review, 1(2), 197-
218. 
Wipf, J., & Garand, D. (2006). Pricing Microinsurance Products. In C. Churchill, 
Protecting the poor: A microinsurance compendium (pp. 238-53). Geneva: International 
Labour Organization. 
Woller, G., & Parsons, R. (2002). Assessing the Community Economic Impact of 
Microfinance Instituitions . Utah: Romney Institute of Public Management. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2000). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Cincinnati: 
South-Western College. 
Yaari, M. E. (1965). Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the 
Consumer. The Review of Economic Studies, 32(2), 137-150. 
Yu, J., & Cooper, H. (1983). A Quantitative Review of Research Design Effects on 
Response Rates to Questionnaires. Journal of Marketing Research, 20, 36-44. 
Yunus, M. (2003). Expanding Microcredit Outreach to Reach the Millenium 
Development Goal: Some Issue for Attention. Dhaka: International Seminar on 
Attacking Poverty with Microcredit. 
95 
Zelizer, V. A. (1979). Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the 
United States. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Zietz, E. N. (2003). An Examination of the Demand for Life Insurance. Risk 
Management and Insurance Review, 6(2), 159-191. 
Zultowski, W. H. (1979). The Extent of Buyer-Initiated Life Insurance Sales. The 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 46(4), 707-714. 
 
96 
9 Appendix 
9.1 Additional Graphs & Tables 
 
Table 17: Definition of explanatory variables 
Variable Description 
Age The respondents’ age measured in years. 
Dependents The number of dependents in household.  
Education Dummy variable indicating the education level of respondent. Takes 
the value 1 for secondary or higher education and 0 for no or primary 
education. 
Location Dummy variable taking the value 1 for urban environment and 0 for 
rural environment of the respondent's household. 
Life-Cycle Constructed interaction variable taking the value 1 if respondent is 
over the age of 49 and has children over age 16 and the value 0 
otherwise. 
Employee Dummy variable taking the value 1 if one household member is 
formally employed and the value 0 otherwise. 
Multi-Earner 
Household 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if more than one household 
member is earning income and the value 0 otherwise. 
Asset Endowment Index value based on the amount of commonly desired assets owned 
by the household. 
Consumption 
Development 
Measures the difference in IDR between households’ daily 
consumption value today and one year before. 
Remittance - received Dummy variable taking the value 1 if respondent's household receives 
regular payments from relatives and the value 0 otherwise. 
Remittance - paid Dummy variable taking the value 1 if respondent's household pay 
regular payments to relatives and the value 0 otherwise. 
Financial Literacy Index value based on the respondent's ability to answer a set of 
financial literacy assessing questions. 
Product Knowledge Index value based on the respondent's ability to answer a set of 
questions related to the previously offered product correctly. 
Trust Degree Index value based on the respondent's own trust assessment in general 
and towards specific groups of persons on a 7-point Likert scale. 
Client Experience Index value based on the respondent's own experience and attitude 
assessment towards the socializer, the MFI, and the Insurer on a 7-
point Likert scale. 
ROSCA Participation Number of informal financial groups the respondent is participating in. 
MFI Tenure Number of months the respondents is already cooperating with the 
MFI which offers the microinsurance plan. 
Brand Recognition Dummy variable taking the value 1 if respondent is able to recognize 
the brand name of the insurer and the value 0 otherwise. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table 19: Pearson correlation coefficient of explanatory variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Participation Age Dependents Education Location Life-Cycle
Asset 
Endowment
Multi-Earner 
Household Employee
Participation 1
Age 0.0088 1
Dependents -0.0472 0.5077 1
Education 0.1531 -0.2407 -0.2971 1
Location 0.0829 -0.0847 -0.1509 0.1469 1
Life-Cycle -0.1446 0.6692 0.4000 -0.1533 -0.0406 1
Asset Endowment 0.1923 0.0939 -0.0154 0.2316 -0.0604 0.0379 1
Multi-Earner Household -0.0299 0.0988 0.0476 -0.1491 -0.1009 0.1027 -0.0557 1
Employee 0.2363 -0.1203 -0.1303 0.3096 0.1499 0.0005 0.2251 -0.0628 1
Remittances received 0.0329 0.1422 0.1034 0.0164 0.1320 0.0857 0.0238 0.0807 -0.1352
Remittances paid 0.1551 -0.0700 0.0006 -0.0887 0.0315 -0.0138 0.0697 0.0825 0.0324
Consumption Development 0.1597 -0.0695 -0.0043 0.1012 0.0522 -0.0400 0.0570 -0.0308 0.1123
Financial Literacy 0.1942 -0.0091 -0.1226 0.2648 0.1163 -0.0596 0.0325 -0.0037 0.1724
Product Knowledge 0.1461 -0.0362 -0.0523 0.1265 0.0391 -0.0446 -0.0386 0.0605 0.0746
Trust Degree 0.0946 0.0716 0.0140 0.0267 -0.1774 -0.0013 0.1502 -0.0419 -0.0810
Client Experience 0.2434 -0.0145 0.0143 0.0694 0.0470 -0.0088 0.0495 0.0749 0.0207
ROSCA participation 0.1271 0.0276 -0.0993 0.0842 0.0678 -0.0752 0.2005 0.0181 0.1431
MFI Tenure 0.0552 0.0290 0.0516 -0.0563 -0.2309 0.0018 -0.0097 0.0753 0.0082
Brand Recognition 0.2126 -0.1104 -0.0273 0.1480 -0.0675 -0.0772 0.0883 -0.0208 0.1261
Remittances 
received
Remittances 
paid
Consumption 
Development
Financial 
Literacy
Product 
Knowledge Trust Degree
Client 
Experience
ROSCA 
participation MFI Tenure
Remittances received 1
Remittances paid 0.0919 1
Consumption Development 0.1184 0.0379 1
Financial Literacy -0.0842 0.1026 0.0168 1
Product Knowledge -0.0380 0.1353 0.0235 0.1745 1
Trust Degree -0.0531 -0.0294 0.1038 0.0163 0.0882 1
Client Experience 0.0541 0.1220 0.0575 0.0263 0.1515 0.3196 1
ROSCA participation 0.0687 0.0201 0.1694 0.1399 -0.0045 0.1386 -0.0338 1
MFI Tenure 0.0804 0.0883 -0.0658 0.0151 0.0737 0.0122 -0.0487 0.0899 1
Brand Recognition 0.0147 -0.0262 0.0222 0.0430 0.2349 0.0954 0.1137 0.1057 0.0876
 
Note: Table states Pearson correlation coefficients for all explanatory variables included in the analysis. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Table 18: Reason to decide against micro life insurance 
Abstaining Reason   
Long Term 22 
Unattractive Benefits 16 
Price 14 
Low Coverage 13 
Offer 12 
Interest 11 
Similiar Product 5 
Undecided 5 
Understanding 4 
Cancelation Fee 3 
Other 4 
Note: Respondents were asked to choose any of the reasons from the options 
given above for abstaining from the product. Multiple selection was possible.  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table 20: Correlation coefficients of client experience breakdown 
Experience 
Correlation
Experience 
Socializer
Attitude 
MFI
Attitude 
Insurer
Experience 
Socializer
1
Attitude MFI 0.4044 1
Attitude 
Insurer
0.3396 0.3732 1
 
Note: Respondents were asked to rate their perception of the experience with the institutions 
involved in the sales process on a 7-point-Likert scale. The results for the three distinguished 
institutions, Socializer, MFI, and Insurer, exhibit high Pearson correlation coefficients and were 
thus aggregated in the Client Experience variable. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 21: Variables with Pearson correlation in excess of +/-0.2 
Age  Education -0.2407 
Age Dependents 0.5077 
Age Life-Cycle 0.6692 
Dependents Education -0.2971 
Dependents Life-Cycle 0.4000 
Education Employee 0.3096 
Education Financial Literacy 0.2648 
Education Asset Endowment 0.2316 
Location MFI Tenure -0.2309 
Asset Endowment Employee 0.2251  
Asset Endowment ROSCA participation 0.2005  
Product Knowledge Brand Recognition 0.2349  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 22: Additional specifications excluding highly correlating variables 
 
Full Model Age Dependents Education Location Assets Product 
  V VI VII IIX IX X XI 
Age 0.0168** 0.0021 0.0041 0.0167** 0.0167** 0.0150** 0.0141** 
(0.0070) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0069) 
Dependents -0.0065   -0.0188 -0.0063 -0.0054 -0.0054 0.0008 
(0.0308)   (0.0307) (0.0302) (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0312) 
Education
+
 0.0332     0.1722* 0.0344 0.0788 0.0431 
(0.1172)     (0.0963) (0.1160) (0.1135) (0.1173) 
Location
+
 0.1360 0.1326 0.1256 0.1504 0.1153 0.1560 0.1033 
(0.1137) (0.1131) (0.1142) (0.1088) (0.1106) (0.1113) (0.1136) 
Life-Cycle
+
 -0.4437***     -0.4021*** -0.4446*** -0.4087*** -0.4263*** 
(0.0969)     (0.1070) (0.0963) (0.1040) (0.1010) 
Asset Endowment 0.4259* 0.4001* 0.4009*   0.4210* 0.4830** 0.4159* 
(0.2528) (0.2316) (0.2306)   (0.2517) (0.2450) (0.2478) 
Multi-Earner 
Household
+
 
-0.0331 -0.0576 -0.0611 -0.0495 -0.0328 -0.0398 -0.0406 
(0.0967) (0.0930) (0.0935) (0.0915) (0.0966) (0.0943) (0.0964) 
Employee
+
 0.1696** 0.1292 0.1286   0.1726**   0.1752** 
(0.0859) (0.0837) (0.0838)   (0.0854)   (0.0863) 
Remittance 
Received
+
 
0.0372 0.0500 0.0497 -0.0198 0.0477 -0.0058 0.0593 
(0.1233) (0.1247) (0.1241) (0.1251) (0.1213) (0.1251) (0.1235) 
Remittance Paid
+
 
0.2091* 0.1719 0.1832 0.2466** 0.2148* 0.2198* 0.1786 
(0.1177) (0.1168) (0.1151) (0.1170) (0.1180) (0.1213) (0.1258) 
Consumption 
Development 
0.0051* 0.0045* 0.0048* 0.0055* 0.0050* 0.0057** 0.0050* 
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Financial Literacy 0.3338 0.3802* 0.3727*   0.3250 0.3461 0.3271 
(0.2203) (0.2066) (0.2073)   (0.2179) (0.2195) (0.2202) 
Product 
Knowledge 
0.0873 0.1136 0.1091 0.0814 0.0905 0.0849 0.1680 
(0.2247) (0.2270) (0.2290) (0.2175) (0.2253) (0.2222) (0.2181) 
Trust Degree 0.1579 0.2067 0.1991 0.1776 0.1611 0.0839 0.1791 
(0.3151) (0.3090) (0.3094) (0.3095) (0.3148) (0.3119) (0.3088) 
Client Experience 0.9421** 0.9194** 0.9325** 0.9136** 0.9396** 0.9482** 1.0266** 
(0.4140) (0.3935) (0.3919) (0.4023) (0.4130) (0.4083) (0.4127) 
ROSCA 
Participation 
-0.0143 0.0046 0.0013 0.0127 -0.0113   -0.0039 
(0.0372) (0.0365) (0.0369) (0.0358) (0.0365)   (0.0374) 
MFI Tenure 0.0029 0.0029 0.0030 0.0026   0.0031 0.0034 
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034)   (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Brand Recognition
+
 0.1975** 0.1736** 0.1793** 0.1974** 0.2011** 0.1994**   
  (0.0871) (0.0857) (0.0854) (0.0859) (0.0868) (0.0879)   
Prob > Chi² 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Pseudo R² 0.1890 0.1490 0.1503 0.1512 0.1871 0.1747 0.1712 
Mean VIF 1.35 1.16 1.35 1.33 1.35 1.33 1.35 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
+
 indicates dummy variables with value between 1 and 0         
Note: The additional specifications above exclude variables which have a Pearson correlation coefficient over +/- 0.2 with the variable 
stated on top of the table. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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9.2 Tamadera Leaflet 
 
 
Figure 4: Marketing brochure for Tamadera microinsurance 
 
Source: http://www.allianz.co.id/NR/rdonlyres/9DA5669E-75F2-4A0E-A746-
EF1AC231B648/8242/AsuransiTamadera_Eng_v11.pdf, (29.02.2012) 
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9.3 Questionnaire 
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